Chapter Four

Combating Jihadism

 

Notwithstanding the imperative of obedience to Muslim authority in Verse 4:59, jihadists invoke Hadith injunctions that sanction rebellion against an Islamic ruler if he becomes impious or unjust.

This chapter attributes the breeding of suicide bombers to charismatic political leaders mixing an explosive cocktail made up of three ingredients: Jihad injunctions, predestination dogma, and the promise of houris (beautiful damsels) in paradise.The cocktail alone is safe. To explode, it needs a spark. The spark can be any number of despairing domestic and/or foreign triggers. 

To combat jihadi terror, Chapter Four advocates deactivating these combustible ingredients and defusing the sparks. The chapter concludes that as long as oil is the main source of global energy, the combustible cocktail is unlikely to be deactivated and the sparks are unlikely to be defused. 

Chapter Four concludes that representative democracy can be an effective medicine to combat the appeal of jihadism. It also considers how the Muslim Brotherhood’s embrace of representative democracy might defeat Wahhabi terror.

Chapter Five 

The fifth chapter asserts that the Arab Spring is not expected to sweep through the Arab world smoothly. Oil will stand in the way of reforms in Saudi Arabia and Egypt until it is driven out of world markets by renewable energy. Meanwhile, however, non-oil exporters like Tunisia and Morocco will be able to develop democratic governance without outside hindrance.

The US has been protecting the al-Saud regime for the past 70 years. Why? To control Saudi oil production and price politics and make global oil supply a part of its arsenal of non-lethal weapons of mass destruction. As global demand for oil skyrocketed from 10 million bbl./day in 1950 to 75 million bbl./day in 2000, US protection of Saudi Arabia intensified as well. Not even Wahhabi culpability for 9/11 was sufficient in 2001 to punish the al-Saud regime. Instead, President George W. Bush devastated Iraq, an adventure that empowered Iran. President Obama further empowered Iran with his policies in Iran, Iraq, and Syria.

 

Chapter Five argues that Washington will protect the al-Saud regime despite its dictatorial rule, hatred-of-the-other culture, human rights abuses, and gender inequality. Ease of dealing/controlling one absolute king who owes his throne and life to US protection is far simpler and more effective than managing scores of parliamentarians and political leaders in a democratic setting. Washington will not pressure the Saudi King to reform for fear that pressure might weaken his control over Saudi Arabia and disrupt oil exports.

 

Given the strong cultural and societal connections between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Egypt will not be allowed to evolve democratic rule either. Riyadh, with help from Washington, will keep democracy away from Egypt in the future, just as they did since 1952, except for the year between June 30, 2012 and July 3, 2013, under the democratically elected president, Muhammad Morsi. 

 

Chapter Five presents the view that the Muslim Brotherhood’s embrace of parliamentary democracy in Egypt could have ushered in an era of modernizing Shari’a (Islamic law). How? In a poor country like Egypt, modern laws to reduce poverty and raise employment must be enacted. The new laws would, of course, be labeled as un-Islamic by Islamists. The debates would open taboo subjects, suppressed under blasphemy laws and cultural norms for centuries. The debates would go a long way to modernizing Shari’a laws.

 

 

Chapter Six

 

Chapter Six describes the five constituencies that form the Saudi power pyramid: The al-Saud royals, Wahhabi ulama, tribal sheikhs, the defense and national security establishment, and merchant families. It considers how Wahhabism evolved during the twentieth century, boomeranged on 9/11, then metastasized into increasingly violent terror groups: Boko Haram (Nigeria), the so-called Islamic State (Iraq and Syria), al-Qaeda (regional), Shabab (Somalia), and the Taliban (Afghanistan). 

 

A hopeful sign is the recent emergence of certain Saudi ulama as agents of political change, calling for elections and separation of government powers. The chapter ends with an argument invoking Verse 42:38 and Prophetic Ahadiths (plural of Hadith; or, words of the Prophet) to counter the Wahhabi palace ulama’s contention that democracy is incompatible with Islam.

 

Chapter Seven

Chapter Seven explores the reasons that could have driven the G.W. Bush administration (2000-2008) to wreak its revenge for the 9/11 attacks on an innocent country, Iraq, instead of Saudi Arabia. 

 

The chapter argues that wittingly or unwittingly, Mr. Bush handed Iraq to Iran on a silver platter without Iran having to fire a shot. President Obama (2008-2016) added to Bush’s performance. He embraced Iran’s sectarian proxy prime minister in Baghdad, Nouri al-Maliki (2006-2014); midwifed the P5+1 nuclear agreement (signed in July 2015); prematurely removed all US troops from Iraq (December 2011), and handed Syria to Iran. The cost to the US was huge. The cost to Iraq and Syria was far greater. 

The march of Shi’ism opened the gates of hell in the Muslim Middle East. These wars have already destroyed, not only most of Iraq, but also most of Syria and Yemen, killed and injured more than five million, and created more than fifteen million refugees. Now that Pandora’s Box has been opened, the Shi’ite/Sunni wars will rage for decades.  

Chapter Seven examines Iran’s strategic influence in Iraq and what lurks behind Iran’s desperate drive to control the Shi’ite dominated southern Iraq and the Baghdad government. 

It ends with addressing Iraq’s superior religious credentials in the world of Shi’ism to that of Iran and the stronger attachment of Arab Shi’tes to Iraq than Iran.

 

 

 

Chapter Nine 

Sectarianism, Dictatorship, and the Destruction of Most of Syria

Chapter Nine addresses the Syrian revolution; what led to it, weaponizing it, Islamicizing it, the myriad parties involved in it, the horrendous toll of it, and finally a likely solution. 

The chapter argues that in religion-gripped Syria, it is unsustainable for a non-representative totalitarian, Assad-ruled 10% Alawite minority to rule over and abuse the 75% Sunni majority forever. It has already brought disaster. 

The Assad regime stands on three pillars. The first is multiple brutal security forces. Amnesty International documented 38 types of terrifying torture methods used by the regime. The second is exploitation of Sunni Islam. The palace clerics threaten the faithful with God’s wrath if they fail to obey Assad blindly, exploiting Verse 4:59. The third is a bombastic war of words against Israel to justify the alliance with Iran and the imposition of emergency laws since 1963 that terrorize the populace. 

Fifty years of police state cruelty were challenged on March 18, 2011 with small protests in the city of Dar’a. Within a few days, Assad had weaponized the protests. He ordered the army to shoot to kill. To avoid the ire of Western public opinion for killing unarmed civilians, he Islamicized the revolution. In a Machiavellian strategy of blackmail legitimacy, he released hardened jihadists from prisons, to make the East and the West choose between tyranny or the jihadists. 

The Assad regime has decapitated organized opposition for the past 50 years. There were no political parties or community leaders to lead the uprising. Some 1,500 different groups appeared on the battlefield. The revolution suffered from relying on Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The two states hate each other. They are US protectorates. President Obama ignored both. 

Obama’s intentions against the revolution became clear quickly. He prevented the supply of anti-warplane guns and repudiated his own red line on Assad’s use of chemical weaponson August 21, 2013. Without US support, the revolution was doomed.Most of Syria was destroyed, with two thirds of Syria’s 20-million population dead, injured and displaced. By aiding in the destruction of Syria, Obama empowered Iran beyond the Bush years.

 

Only Moscow and Washington can resolve the Syrian calamity, most likely through a barter exchange, a cease fire arrangement to be monitored by a U.N./Arab force, removal of Assad, democratic elections, and a truth and reconciliation commission. It would be sensible to create a democratic system of governance with self-ruled regions within a federal Syria, based on sectarian and ethnic lines: Alawites, Christians, Druzes, Isma’ilis, Sunnis, Arabs, Armenian,Assyrians, Circassian,Kurds, Syriacs, and Turkman. 

 

The US can take advantage of Syrians’ hatred of Assad and Russia to arm a new Syrian army from amongst the 12 million Syrians displaced inside and outside the country, and who lost homes and relatives. Washington could turn Syria into an Afghanistan for Russia without the involvement of American troops, save for advisors and weapons. Whether the Trump White House would choose to invoke this option is uncertain, given Mr. Trump’s mysterious fascination with Mr. Putin.