The March of Shi’ism
Emboldened by gains in Iraq and Syria,
the Qom theocrats in Iran have been exploiting the Shi’ite sectarian card to
enhance Iran’s regional reach. Being the largest Shi’ite country, the
ayatollahs have appointed themselves protectors of Shi’ites everywhere.
Former US Ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay
Khalilzad, one of the architects of the Iraq misadventure claimed, “The 2003
toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime had opened a Pandora’s box of volatile
ethnic and sectarian tensions.”[3]
Khalilzad described a “worst-case scenario in which religious extremists could
take over sections of Iraq and begin to expand outward.”[4]
Khalilzad’s prophesy came true in 2014 when the so-called Islamic State was
born (see Chapter Seven). With Iraq and Syria under control, an overconfident
Ayatollah Khamenei launched an aggressive march of Shi’ism crusade against his
Sunni neighbors.
Iran in
Syria
As conditions on the ground for the Assad
regime deteriorated between 2011 and early 2013, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard's Quds
Force helped create Syria’s National Defense Forces (NDF), a paramilitary
organization composed of 100,000 fighters.[5] NDF is
funded by Iran, according to Mohammad Reza Naghdi, the commander-in-chief of Iran's own
paramilitary force, the Basij.[6] As it became clear that there were
insufficient Syrian forces to fight rebel groups, Iran facilitated the deployment
of foreign Shia militias,[7] starting with Iraqi Shia groups and
Lebanon’s Hezbollah (see below: The Roots of the Iran/
Hezbollah Axis).
Iran’s
influence in Afghanistan grew considerably as the US overthrew the Taliban regime
following 9/11. For example, while 10% of Afghanistan’s 35 million citizens are
Shi’ites, a third of the 2018 Parliamentary seats is occupied by Shi’ites. Also,
one of the Afghanistan’s two vice presidents and one of the two deputy prime
ministers are Shi’ites.
Until April 2016, the number of Iranian paramilitary
personnel operating in Syria was estimated at between 6,500 and 9,200. In April
2016, Iran dispatched its special forces to Syria.[11] To
Syria’s Sunnis, the presence of Iranian soldiers is particularly provocative,
not only because of their Shi’ite sectarianism but also their non-Arab
ethnicity.
Financially, Iran is
heavily invested in Syria. Staffan de Mistura, UN special envoy for Syria, is
quoted as saying that Iran spends $6 billion annually on Assad’s government,
while some researchers estimate that “Iran spent between $14 and $15 billion in
military and economic aid to the Damascus regime in 2012 and 2013.”[12]
Additionally, Iranian
credit lines and oil sales to Syria have softened and limited the drop in the
value of the Syrian Lira in terms of the US dollar.
Why Is Iran Anti-Israel?
For the Tehran regime to survive, it
must rally Iran’s masses behind a confrontation with a powerful external enemy.
If such an enemy does not exist, it must be invented. Conveniently,
Israel is the perfect enemy for the Qom ayatollahs from a religious and political point of view. The confrontation with Israel gives the ayatollahs
a license to crush the slightest opposition at home for “weakening the morale
of the populace in the middle of the confrontation with the Israeli enemy.”
As an added benefit, the anti-Israel
game ingratiates the ayatollahs with the Palestinian people and Arab masses.
Qom’s ayatollahs use anti-Israel rhetoric as a proselytization tool to convert
Sunnis to Shi’ism.
The fact that Israel has not threatened Iran’s security
does not matter. The ayatollahs have constructed an image of Israel in the
Iranian national discourse as if it were Iran’s most dangerous threat, an
existential risk. Until the Shah of Iran was deposed by Ayatollah Khomeini, on
February 11, 1979, Iran and Israel had cordial relations.
Historically, Persia and the Jewish people were not
enemies. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in a speech at the United Nations
General Assembly in 2013 noted, “Some 2,500 years ago, the great Persian king
Cyrus ended the Babylonian exile of the Jewish people. He issued a famous edict
in which he proclaimed the right of the Jews to return to the land of Israel
and rebuild the Jewish temple in Jerusalem. That’s a Persian decree. And thus
began an historic friendship between the Jews and the Persians that lasted
until modern times.”[13]
To prove their anti-Israel credentials, the ayatollahs
built Hezbollah on Israel’s borders in order to unleash it whenever it becomes
politically convenient. This happened on July 12, 2006. “Hezbollah guerillas crossed into Israel, killed three Israeli soldiers,
and kidnapped two others, precipitating a war with Israel.”[14] The war ended on August 14, 2006.[15]
Israel’s losses were surprisingly high.[16]
There could have been a connection between the 2006 war
and the P5+1 nuclear deal negotiations with Iran. The discussions were tough. On April 11, 2006, Iran announced that it has
enriched uranium for the first time to about 3.5 percent at the Natanz pilot
enrichment plant.[17]
The 2006 war was a demonstration to Western powers and Israel of the shape of
things to come if they were tempted to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities.
The Roots of the Iran/ Hezbollah Axis
A close
religious connection has existed between Iran and the Shi’ites of Lebanon for
the past five centuries. To add religious fervor into Persia’s wars against the
Sunni Ottoman Empire, Shah Ismail (1501-1524) made Shi’ism the state religion
of the Safavid dynasty (1502-1737) instead of Sunnism. Lacking the necessary
clerics to effect the conversion, Shi’ite scholars from southern Lebanon’s
Mount Amel were imported to establish schools and train Persian clerics in
Shi’ite laws, rituals, and way of life. Ever since that time, a bridge between
Iran and Lebanon has flourished.
For centuries, Lebanon’s Shi’ite population was
discriminated against. Their fortunes began to improve in 1959 with the arrival
of Musa al-Sadr to the coastal city of Tyre. Al-Sadr was an Iranian-born
Lebanese Shiite cleric, son of a long line of distinguished Shi’ite scholars.
At the turn of the nineteenth century, Sadr’s ancestors escaped Ottoman
mistreatment from Tyre and moved to Iraq’s holy city of Najaf, and then to
Iran.
For the
Shiites of Lebanon, Musa al-Sadr awakened a sense of dignity and self-worth
previously unknown. He replaced their innate self-pity, sorrow, and submission
with a fiery spirit of hope, defiance, and revolution. In 1974, he formed the
Movement of the Disinherited, a political movement aimed at social justice. In
1975, the Amal movement was formed as the militia wing of the Movement of the
Disinherited.
In 1982, after Sadr’s suspicious disappearance in 1978,
while on a visit to Colonel Qaddafi in Libya, the momentum of his work gave
rise to Hezbollah, a trained, organized militia, funded by Ayatollah Khomeini’s
Revolutionary Guards. In 2016,
Hezbollah had about 21,000 active duty fighters and 24,000 reservists, with a
stockpile of around 130,000 rockets of different types and ranges (up to 400
kilometers), hundreds of drones, and thousands of anti-tank missiles.[18]
Hezbollah is the only body of Shi’ites
outside Iran that pledges allegiance to the Iranian faqih. Hezbollah’s deputy
secretary general Sheikh Naim Qassem’s was quoted as saying in August 2011
that, “Wilayat al-faqih is the reason for Hezbollah’s establishment.”[19] On October 8, 1997, the United States designated
Hezbollah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.
Hezbollah in Syria
According
to the US Department of State’s Foreign Terrorist Organizations Report (2016), there are about 7,000 Hezbollah fighters in Syria.[20] According to Newsweek magazine, Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria between 2011
and 2016 cost the terrorist organization some 2,000 to 2,500 killed, and some
7,000 injured.[21]
Hezbollah’s fighters proved to be more capable than the
Syrian army, and their involvement in Syria provided them with serious battlefield experience. Hezbollah’s intervention has taken four principal
forms: training for regular Syrian forces and irregular Syrian and foreign
militia forces, combat advisory roles, combat participation, and a separate and
more focused effort to build up capability to strike Israel from southern
Syria.[22] Hezbollah
may be described today as Iran’s weapon of mass destruction on Israel’s border
with Lebanon.
[1] “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards: We Have Armed 200,000 Fighters in the
Region,” Middle East Monitor.
[2] “Iran:
After Aleppo, We Will Intervene in Bahrain, Yemen,” Al Arabiya, December 16, 2016,
https://english.alarabiya.net/en/features/2016/12/16/Iran-s-Revolutionary-Guard-After-Aleppo-we-will-intervene-in-Bahrain-and-Yemen.html
[3] Borzou
Daragahi, “Envoy to Iraq Sees
Threat of Wider War,” Los Angeles
Times, (March 7, 2006).
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/mar/07/world/fg-envoy7
[5] Royal United Services Institute for
Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), Understanding
Iran’s Role in the Syrian Conflict, P.4.
[6] Hossein Bastani, “Iran
Quietly Deepens Involvement in Syria's War,” BBC,
(October 20, 2015),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34572756
[8] Philip Smyth, “Iran's
Afghan Shiite Fighters in Syria,” The
Washington Institute, (June 3, 2014),
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-afghan-shiite-fighters-in-syria
[9] Hashmatallah Moslih, “Iran 'Foreign Legion' Leans on Afghan Shia in Syria War,”Al Jazeera, (January 22, 2016).
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/01/iran-foreign-legion-leans-afghan-shia-syria-war-160122130355206.html
[10] Royal United Services Institute for
Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), Understanding
Iran’s Role in the Syrian Conflict,J(e
Times of Israel, s-donationsch 2017) ebted and grateful to Mama
Merkel"isons. f the Prophet Muhammad. Fatima is sister of Im P. 4.
[12] Shahir ShahidSaless,
“Iran’s
Plan to Confront a Post-Assad Era,” Huffington Post.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shahir-shahidsaless/irans-plan-to-confront-a_b_8510186.html
[13] “Full
Text of Netanyahu’s 2013 Speech to the UN General Assembly,” The Times of Israel, (November
21, 2013).
https://www.timesofisrael.com/full-text-netanyahus-2013-speech-to-the-un-general-assembly/
[14] From the US Department of State statement on Dec. 1,
2011, “What
Was the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War?,” ProCon.org. (February
22, 2012).
https://israelipalestinian.procon.org/view.answers.php?questionID=000981
[16] Alistair Crooke and Mark Perry, “How Hezbollah Defeated Israel,” Counterpunch, (October 13, 2006).
https://www.counterpunch.org/2006/10/13/how-hezbollah-defeated-israel-2/
[17] “Timeline
of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran,” Arms Control Association.
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran
[18] “Hezbollah, “From
Terror Group to Army,” Haaretz,
(December 7, 2016).
[19] “Hezbollah MP Credits Wilayat al Fakih for Saving
Lebanon,” YALIBNAN,
(November 2, 2014).
http://yalibnan.com/2014/11/02/hezbollah-mp-credits-wilayat-al-fakih-saving-lebanon/
[20] US Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering
Violent Extremism, “Foreign
Terrorist Organizations,” (2016).
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2016/272238.htm
[21] Mona Alami, “Will Hezbollah
Remain in Syria Forever?,” Newsweek, (March 28, 2017).
http://www.newsweek.com/will-hezbollah-remain-syria-forever-573818
[22] Royal United Services Institute for
Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), Understanding
Iran’s Role in the Syrian Conflict.