The late Saudi Crown Prince and Interior
Minister Prince Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz al-Saud (who died on June 16,
2012), was intensely against the Muslim Brotherhood. He declared in a
November 2002 interview with the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Siyassah,
carried by the Saudi Press Agency, “All our problems come from the
Muslim Brotherhood… The Muslim Brotherhood has destroyed the Arab
world.”[1] More recently, the New York Times
reported that a question in February 2011 about the improving prospects
of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood set Prince Nayif off on “a diatribe
against both the treachery of the Brotherhood and the journalist who
asked the question, with the prince labeling the journalist a terrorist
sympathizer.”[2]
THE ARAB SPRING: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
Prince Nayif had three good reasons to
be worried. First, the democratic ballot box that brought the Muslim
Brotherhood to power in Egypt and other Arab Spring countries contrasts
greatly with his father’s use of the sword and Wahhabism as well as
British assistance to create the family’s enterprise in 1932. Ever since
that time, the sword and Wahhabism–combined with U.S. support–have
guaranteed the survival of the al-Sauds’ system. “What we won by the
sword, we will keep by the sword,” revealed Prince Nayif in 2003.[3]
The al-Sauds must fear that future
democratic parliamentary and presidential elections in Egypt and other
Arab countries, coupled with articulated Islamic reasoning in support of
democratic representative governance in Islam, will pressure Riyadh’s
absolute monarchy to become representative and participatory, let alone a
republic.
Second, Muslim Brotherhood governments will challenge the
al-Sauds’ allegation that theirs is the only “true” Islamic regime in
the Arab and Muslim worlds. For eight decades now, the alliance between
the al-Saud and Abd al-Wahhab clans have claimed the religious high
ground.
The Wahhabi clerics have denigrated
Shi’i Islam and other religions as heretical. They have also criticized
the three other Sunni rites (Hanafi, Maliki, and Shafi’i) as
insufficiently Islamic and preached that non-Wahhabi Muslims and
non-Muslims will end up in hellfire. The Wahhabi clerics propagate that
Islam, according to Muhammad, would split into 73 sects, but only one
sect, the Wahhabi sect, would inherit paradise.
In July 2012, Wahhabi cleric Dr. Sa’ad
al-Durayhim caused a stir when he tweeted that even within Saudi Arabia
“the saved sect will be the Najdi ulama and the Najdi people and their
followers.”[4] Najd is the hot bed of Wahhabism.[5]
Yet in their claim of superiority, the Wahhabi ulama ignore Koran 9:97:
“The desert Arabians are most confirmed in unbelief and hypocrisy.”
They also disregard Sahih al-Bukhari’s reported prophetic statement that from Najd “comes out the horn of Satan.”[6]
The third reason for concern is the
modernization and reform of Arab Islam. This could undermine the
al-Sauds’ religious credentials and political legitimacy. It might even
tame Wahhabi extremism.
This article will only discuss Arab
Sunni Islam. Arabs represent around a quarter of world’s Muslims. Among
Arab Muslims, more than 90 percent are Sunni.
Influenced by the teachings of Ahmad bin
Hanbal (d. 855), Wahhabism is more austere, extreme, rigid, and
coercive than the other Islamic rites and sects. In the Wahhabi book, to
protect monotheism from idolatry, a person’s love for God must be so
total, intense, and pure that an ancestor’s grave, for example, must
remain unmarked and never visited so that the family’s love of God would
not be adulterated by their love for the ancestor. Further, good
Muslims should spend their free time in prayer and reading the Koran;
better yet, memorizing its 6,236 verses instead of diluting their love
of God with the love of music, painting, or reading a novel. Moroccan
sociologist Fatima Mernissi considers that Islamists see love between a
man and a woman as a threat to the couple’s allegiance to Allah.[7]
As a result of its extremism, Hanbalism
failed over the centuries to attract a large following. Presently,
despite Saudi oil wealth and active proselytizing at home and abroad,
only around 2 percent of world’s Sunnis follow this rite. Mostly are in
Saudi Arabia, among the Taliban minorities in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
and in tiny Qatar, in addition to an indeterminate number (possibly a
few million) of expatriate workers who held and continue to hold jobs in
Saudi Arabia and became indoctrinated in the Wahhabi creed.
THE EMERGENCE OF ARAB POLITICAL ISLAM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood
movement, as well as Sharif Husayn’s 1916 revolt against the Ottoman
Empire during the First World War, reflect, in part, the Arab reaction
to Istanbul’s modernization and secularization policies beginning in the
early nineteenth century. While Mustafa Kemal Ataturk blamed the
Ottoman decline and destruction on the failure of a rigid Islam to
evolve with the modern age, Arab Muslims regarded the Ottoman defeat as a
punishment from God for abandoning Islam. In 1924, Turkey abolished the
caliphate and separated Islam from the state. In 1928, the Muslim
Brotherhood came into being in Egypt, while Wahhabism seized power in
Riyadh in 1932.
The history of Saudi rule is a history
of exploiting extreme Islamism for political legitimacy. In 1805,
Muhammad Bin Saud joined Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab, the pioneer of
Wahhabi doctrine, in a rebellion against Istanbul. They accused the
Ottoman sultans of corrupting the “true” Islam. In 1817, acting on
behalf of the Ottoman sultan, Egyptian ruler Muhammad Ali crushed that
rebellion. However, in the early 1900s, Abd al-Aziz al-Saud allied his
clan with the Abd al-Wahhab clan once more and led a second rebellion
against Ottoman rule, once again using the restoration of the “true”
Islam as a pretext. The second rebellion succeeded in establishing Saudi
Arabia, the kingdom that bears the al-Saud family name, in 1932.
The Muslim Brotherhood was formed in
1928 in Egypt. Today, the Brotherhood claims to operate in 70 countries
under different incarnations.[8]
It has changed colors in recent years by renouncing violence and
advocating democratic representative governance. This strategy has paid
off. In Tunisia’s parliamentary elections, the Islamic al-Nahda party
achieved 41 percent of the votes cast (October 2011). In Morocco, the
Islamic Justice and Development Party achieved 27 percent of the votes
cast (November 2011), more than any other party. In Tunisia and Morocco,
the leaders of the winning parties became president and prime
ministers. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate won the
presidency with 51.7 percent of the votes cast (June 2012).
Further, in all Arab monarchies and
republics (excluding Lebanon), Islam is the religion of the state (In
Syria, Islam is the religion of the president instead).[9]
Also, Shari’a law is either “the main” source of legislation, “a
principal” source of legislation, or “the basis” of legislation. The
exceptions are Tunisia and Jordan, where Shari’a is not mentioned. Arab
personal status laws also follow Shari’a rules, except in Tunisia, where
polygamy and Shari’a courts were abolished in 1956. Even the former
Iraqi dictator, the supposedly “secular” Saddam Hussein, added the words
“Allahu Akbar” (God is great) to the Iraqi flag in 1991.
WHY ARAB RULERS EXPLOIT ISLAM
Islam has been used by Arab rulers as a
means to prolong their dictatorships. The word “Islam” means submission
or surrender–surrendering to God, to Muhammad, and to Muslim authority.
Koran verse 4:59 reads: “Obey God and obey God’s messenger and obey
those of authority among you.” Such wording occurs dozens of times
throughout the Koran. In addition, according to the canonical Hadith collection of Sahih Muslim,
Muhammad reportedly said, “He who obeys me, obeys God; he who disobeys
me, disobeys God. He who obeys the ruler, obeys me; he who disobeys the
ruler, disobeys me.”[10] Similar wording appears dozens of times in Sahih Muslim and other canonical Hadith collections.
As a result of these injunctions a
culture of obedience to hierarchical authority developed in Arab
societies–male ruling over the female, the father over the children and
wife (or wives), the teacher over the student, employer over the
employee, and so forth. Arab kings and presidents have taken advantage
of these commands. Whether in Riyadh, Damascus, or Cairo, the palace
ulama–in return for wealth and power–have energetically indoctrinated
the masses into believing that blind obedience to the king or president (wali al-amr) is at the heart of the Islamic faith, synonymous with piety.
Verse 4:59 became a psychological weapon
against political dissent, supplementing Arab rulers’ brigades of
security forces. In this respect, Saudi Arabia is unique. Security
measures are turned into Wahhabi dictums in order to eliminate the
potential opposition to the regime of one half of the population;
namely, Saudi women. Male guardianship rules over women mean that a
husband, father, son, or brother of an errant wife, mother, daughter, or
sister must pledge in writing to the police his assurances and
responsibility for the woman’s future infractions. Further restrictions
on women in Saudi Arabia include severe gender segregation, a ban on
driving, the requirement to wear a head-to-toe black cloak, the ability
to obtain a passport or to travel only with her guardian’s permission,
and even being forbidden to undergo any type of surgery without the
guardian’s approval.
On March 11, 2002, a fire broke out at a
girls’ school in Mecca. Firemen and concerned citizens quickly arrived
on the scene. However, the religious police locked the schoolgirls
inside the inferno rather than let them escape into the streets without
their veils and head-to-toe cloaks. For this same reason, the religious
police prevented the firemen from entering the school to rescue the
girls for fear that the girls would be seen without their coverings. As a
result, fifteen young girls burned to death and dozens more were
injured.[11]
These restrictions are all enforced in
the name of the “true” Islam, but in reality serve to tighten the
regime’s security grip on the population. As if to legitimize the
actions of the religious police concerning this incident, a noted Saudi
cleric, Abd al-Rahman al-Barrak, opined in a fatwa (religious
ruling or decree) in 2010 that those who promote heresies like the
mixing of men and women in the workplace or in educational institutions
should be put to death.[12] Islamic scholars at Egypt’s al-Azhar University were outraged and demanded al-Rahman retract the fatwa.[13]
CONTRADICTING 4:59
On December 17, 2010, in Sidi Bouzid,
Tunisia, a 26-year-old vegetable street vendor, Muhammad Bouazizi,
burned himself to death. Bouazizi’s actions might have been triggered by
his poverty and the disregard of the local authorities. However, the
following hadith provides a religious cover for those who rebel against
the Muslim ruler: “Whoever of you sees an evil action, let him change it
with his hand; and if he is not able to do so, then with his tongue;
and if he is not able to do so, then with his heart.”[14]
Political leaders have used this to rally the disaffected against the
Muslim ruler. Although the Arab Spring was triggered by the generally
secular Facebook generation, it was hijacked by the well-organized
Muslim Brotherhood parties and by other Islamists, by Salafists, and
jihadists. The above hadith provided these groups with the justification
to remove the Tunisian, Egyptian, Libyan, and Yemeni presidents from
office and has sustained the popular uprising against Bashar al-Asad in
Damascus.
ARE WESTERN FEARS OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD EXAGGERATED?
Western fears of the Muslim Brotherhood
may be exaggerated. An Islamic regime does not necessarily mean its
policies will be anti-Western or anti-American any more than a secular
regime means one with pro-Western and pro-American policies. Three
examples will illustrate.
Wahhabi Saudi Arabia is the world’s most
extreme Islamist regime; yet for eight decades Riyadh has been
obsequious to and protected by Washington. In the case of Tunisia, its
ruling party, al-Nahda, while Islamic, refuses to add Shari’a law as a
source of legislation in the country’s forthcoming constitution, despite
demands by Tunisian Islamists for an Islamist constitution.[15]
On the other hand, Syria, a so-called “secular” regime has been
anti-Western and anti-American for decades. Indeed, Syria is more
Islamic today than in 1963, when Hafiz al-Asad seized power. Like Hafiz
al-Asad’s 1973 constitution, son Bashar’s new 2012 constitution makes
Islam the religion of the president (Article 3 (1)) and enshrines the
Islamic Shari’a as a main source of legislation (Article 3 (2)).
Seventh-century Shari’a laws and courts
continue to regulate Muslims’ personal status affairs in “secular”
Syria. For example, Shari’a allows a man to engage in polygamy–marry
four wives simultaneously (4:3) and to divorce any of them at will
(2:227-2:237), with limited alimony or child custody. The law also
prohibits a Muslim woman from marrying a non-Muslim while a Muslim man
is allowed to marry non-Muslims (5:5). In addition, it equates two women
to one man in inheritance (4:11) and when serving as a witness in court
(2:282).
Religious dogma has taken center stage
in Syria. An increasing number of mosques and veiled women have become
common sights in “secular” Syria. During a period of drought in the
winter of 2010, Bashar al-Asad, trained as an eye doctor, ordered a
special rain prayer, which was performed in mosques across the country
on December 10, 2010. Syria’s elementary, middle, and high schools teach
Sunni Islam, regardless of the Islamic sect to which a pupil belongs.
The textbooks are also discriminatory, divisive, and intolerant of
non-Muslims. It is difficult to imagine how a future Muslim Brotherhood
regime in Syria could be more Islamic or belligerent toward Europe and
America than the Asad regime.
THE LIKELIHOOD OF GENUINE ARAB RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL REFORMS
The Arab Spring could lead to three
significant developments. The first is the marginalization of Islamists,
Salafists, and jihadists. The second is the reform of Arab Islam. Third
is the establishment of democratic representative governance. Such
possibilities were unthinkable even just before the advent of the Arab
Spring. Contributing to this shift are three factors:
- The ascent of non-Wahhabi, non-Salafi, non-jihadi politicians to commanding political positions in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia.
- The many contradictory injunctions that exist in the Islamic scripture.
- The abject poverty, high unemployment, and low rates of economic growth in the non-oil producing Arab countries.
To appreciate the future challenges
facing the new governments, it would be helpful to outline the religious
structures that have prevented Arab Islam from forming new religious
opinions or further interpreting the Koran and Sunna for a thousand
years.
To Sunnis, Shari’a law has four sources.
The first is said to be the work of God–the Koran. The other three were
constructed by the ulama during the first two centuries after
Muhammad’s death in 632; namely, the consensus of the Sunni ulama,
analogical deduction, and the Sunna (Muhammad’s hadith (sayings) and
Sira (actions)). The hadith, totaling about 34,000 traditions (including
repetitions), was collected in six books, considered canonical by
Sunnis[16]
(Shi’a have their own hadith collections, whereas the Koranists
disregard the Sunna altogether as unreliable). The violation of the
established dogma would come at a heavy price, even death.
To the ulama class, an unchanging
Shari’a is their safeguard to the maintenance of their political
influence, social standing, and lucrative careers. As teachers,
preachers, muftis, judges, and court officials, they realize that
religious reform would reduce their hold on the faithful and deprive
them of these benefits. Today, Muslims are admonished and threatened
with God’s eternal damnation if they fail to seek or heed the ulama’s
guidance on the tiniest details of daily living. The religious advice
columns in Arabic newspapers and on Arabic radio and television programs
deal with such issues as how to greet a guest, what to say to a person
who sneezes, whether to have a tattoo, or to color one’s hair, or to
darken one’s eyebrows, or to wear a silk garment, or a gold ring, what
to eat, how to eat, etc.
Marginalizing Islamists, Salafists, and Jihadists
The new Arab Spring governments realize
that unless they reduce poverty and unemployment quickly and
convincingly, they stand no chance for reelection. Their performance in
office will be the test. Having won all the authority, the new regimes
must bear all the responsibility. In Egypt, the removal on August 12,
2012, of the head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)
Field Marshall Husayn Tantawi and Chief of Staff General Sami Anan make
it impossible for President Muhammad Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood to
blame any failure on the generals.
Of course, there is the risk that a
government dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood might betray the
democratic process that brought them into power in the first place. The
Brotherhood could decide to abandon democratic elections and instead
build an Islamist dictatorship. However, there is the hope that the
masses, who triggered the Arab Spring, would ensure that the new
governments would not trample over democratic rule.
The new governments recognize that
dogmatic and rhetorical religious and nationalistic posturing will
produce neither jobs, nor housing, nor health services, nor prosperity.
They thus have little choice but to enact laws that would reorder
national budgetary priorities away from military spending and toward
human development and economic growth. To make graduates employable in
modern jobs, emphasis must be placed on teaching the sciences. The new
governments will have to welcome foreign investors’ capital and
encourage the flow of dollars and euros from tourism. Further, the new
governments are not likely to introduce supreme religious councils to
nullify parliamentary laws–which are deemed to be non-compliant with
seventh-century Shari’a rules. Nor are they likely to form religious
police forces to coerce people into an alien way of life from that of
the Arabian Desert, nor to compound poverty by preventing women from
earning wages to help sustain their impoverished families.
There will almost certainly be a
confrontation between the new governments and Islamists, Salafists, and
jihadists, as the latter groups assail the new laws as un-Islamic. The
leader of the Ansar al-Shari’a group, Sayfullah bin Husayn, already
attacked the government on October 23, 2012, claiming it to be a stooge
of the “atheistic West”–America and France, in particular—and that its
Islam was farthest from the “true” Islam. The Muslim Brotherhood
leadership and ulama would counter the attacks with references and
intellectual arguments from the Muslim holy script–a debate that could
set the stage for the evolution of a more tolerant, less austere,
extreme, and less coercive Islam than Wahhabi Islam, which shaped the
Taliban, bin Ladin, al-Qa’ida, and led to September 11.
Of course, the possibility exists that
the new governments might pursue strategies amenable to Salafi and
jihadi leaders. Such gestures, however, are unlikely to succeed. New
uncompromising Salafi and jihadi leaders would sideline the compromisers
and accuse them of treachery, let alone heresy.
To eliminate a terrorist cell or
two–even a hundred or a thousand–will not root out terrorism. The wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan did not and will not eradicate terrorism. To
fight terrorism, not only must the financial and material infrastructure
of jihadism be destroyed, but the Wahhabi and other extremist doctrinal
foundations upon which jihadism rests must too be dismantled.
Intellectual reasoning drawn from the Koran and the Sunna as articulated
by credible Arab ulama is crucial. Non-Arab ulama and Western scholars
have no effect on the beliefs of Arab Muslims. Arab Muslims feel they
are the guardians of an Arabic religion: The Koran describes the Arab
race as the “best nation evolved to mankind” (3:110). Muhammad, his
Companions, the Koran, and the holy Muslim sanctuaries in Mecca, Medina,
and Jerusalem are all Arabic. Non-Arab ulama are viewed with suspicion
and as irrelevant.
Currently, it is the Muslim
Brotherhood-dominated Arab Spring governments that provide the best hope
to tame Islamist extremism. The possibility of achieving meaningful
Islamic and political reforms under such governments outweighs the risks
involved. Indeed, there is little alternative to the hope that an
Islamic government chosen by the people through free democratic
elections would lead to meaningful Islamic and political reforms.
Reforming Arab Islam
The Arab Spring could also lead some to
challenge the traditionist ulama’s views on taboo subjects and bring
about changes such as reconciling the contradictory verses in the
Islamic scripture and instituting representative democratic governance.
Contradictions on the same subjects inspire moderate Muslims, Islamists,
Salafists, and jihadists in different ways. The treatment of Christians
and Jews, the treatment of women, the punishment for adultery and
apostasy from Islam will be discussed next.
On relations with non-Muslims, a
moderate Muslim focuses on the peaceful and tolerant verses, such as
2:136: “Say; We believe in God, and the revelation given to us, and to
Abraham, Ismail, Isaac, Jacob and their progeny, and that which was
given to Moses and Jesus, and to all the prophets by their Lord,” or,
for example, 29:46: “Do not argue with the People of the Book
[Christians and Jews] unless in a fair way.” A moderate would point out
that the Koran dedicates Chapter 14 with its 52 verses to Abraham, and
Chapter 12 with its 111 verses to Joseph. To Mary, the mother of Jesus,
the Koran dedicates Chapter 19 with its 98 verses. In 2:135, the Koran
refers to Islam as the Religion of Abraham.
On the other hand, an Islamist finds
inspiration in verses such as 2:120: “Never will the Jews or the
Christians be satisfied with you unless you follow their religion,” and
5:51: “Take not the Jews and the Christians for your friends.” Other
examples include 5:78: “Curses were pronounced on those among the
children of Israel who rejected faith, by the tongue of David and of
Jesus,” and 62:5: “The example of those who were entrusted with the
Torah, which they did not observe, is that of a donkey who carries a
load of books (oblivious of what the books contain).”
A jihadist is drawn to verses like
2:216: “Fighting is prescribed for you”; 8:60: “Against them make ready
your strength to the utmost, that you may strike terror into the enemies
of God”; 9:5: “Slay the polytheists wherever you find them and take
them captive and besiege them and lie in wait for them at every
conceivable place”; and 9:29: “Fight those who believe not in God nor
the Last Day… even if they are of the People of the Book until they pay
the protective tax (jizya) with willing submission, and feel themselves
subdued.” The promise of the eternal delights in paradise for the
martyrs (61:11-12) also encourages jihadists. That 15 of the 19
terrorists involved in September 11 (all Wahhabis) were Saudis is not a
coincidence. While Islamists and jihadists may be hostile toward
Christians and Jews because they purportedly conspired against the
Muhammad 14 centuries ago, a moderate might befriend the People of the
Book viewing them as innocent of the alleged accusations against their
ancestors and because the historicity of the Islamic creed is not
established reliably.
On the treatment of women, while the
personal status affairs of Muslims in all Arab countries (except
Tunisia) follow Shari’a rules, Islamists go beyond Shari’a to impose
additional restrictions on women. Regarding appearances, while 24:31
requires women to be modest in dress and behavior, Islamists demand
women cover themselves completely: face, hair, and toes. Regarding
gender segregation, while there is no Koranic injunction to segregate
the genders–except in the specific case of the wives of Muhammad
(33:53)–Islamists enforce gender segregation in schools, parks, the
workplace, and even in elevators.
The Sunna, too, contains unflattering references to women. Muhammad reportedly said that most of those in hell are women[17];
that women’s lack of intelligence is the reason the weight of a woman’s
testimony in an Islamic court of law is equal to half the testimony of a
Muslim male[18];
and that the reason women are prohibited from praying and fasting
during menstruation is due to their being deficient in religious belief.[19]
The contradictions between Muhammad’s
treatment of his first wife Khadija and how the Shari’a evolved on the
treatment of women must be reconciled. We are told that Khadija was a
successful businesswoman; that she employed young Muhammad; that she
proposed marriage to him when he was about 25 years-old; and that she
was about 15 years his senior and twice a widow. We are told that for
the 25 years of Muhammad’s marriage to Khadija, until her death in 620,
he remained monogamous and faithful to her; that she was his confidant
and the first convert to Islam.
Such serious contradictions suggest that
either the stories about Muhammad’s exemplary treatment of Khadija are
false or the Islamic scripture is false, tailored by generations of
Muslims to suit the political agendas and personal interests of the
ruling classes. In this regard, a meaningful first step was announced in
June 2006: Turkey formed a committee of 35 religious scholars to study
the removal of all Hadith references attributed to Muhammad that
encourage violence against women.[20]
Muslims also disagree on the punishment
for adultery. While a moderate might believe in 24:2: “Flog each of
them with a hundred lashes,” an Islamist could invoke traditions
attributed to Muhammad to stone adulterers to death. Finally, on
apostasy from Islam, to absolve the apostate from punishment, a moderate
might cite 2:256: “Let there be no compulsion in religion” and 18:29:
“The truth is from your Lord: so believe if you like, or do not believe
if you will.” However, an Islamist might invoke to traditions attributed
to Muhammad to impose the death penalty.
Establishing Representative Governance
Muhammad reportedly said, “My community reaches no agreement that is in error.”[21]
According to the hadith, the truth on all matters is dependent upon
whatever the Muslim community decides. Before the advent of electricity,
computers, telecommunications, and modern polling techniques, gauging
the community’s opinion in its far-flung lands was impossible. Thus, the
opinion of a caucus of learned men made the Consensus of the Ulama one
of the four sources of Sunni Shari’a law. It was a pragmatic
approximation to the possible verdict of the majority of the Muslim
community.
Today, however, modern technology has
made referendums on specific issues simple, just as it has made the
election of community representatives easy. Modern telecommunications
and polling techniques have allowed the hadith to become a reality. For
the religiously minded, democratic parliamentary and presidential
elections–like those that took place in Arab Spring countries–should
provide the comfort that their elected representatives would enact laws
that are not in error.
The Hadith makes the nation the source
of all powers. It challenges the ulama’s contention that Shari’a is the
unchangeable law of God. It renders the Consensus of the Ulama and
Analogical Deduction unnecessary. It also introduces, for the first time
in the Arab world, a mechanism to replace an unjust ruler peacefully.
Since the advent of Islam, Arab dictators had only one way to be
challenged; namely, the sword. It may be said that Muslim countries that
hinder the emergence of democratically elected parliaments are in
violation of the Hadith: “My community reaches no agreement that is in
error.”
NOTES
[2]
Neil MacFarquhar, “Nayef bin Abdul Aziz, Saudi Crown Prince Who Led
Crackdown on Al Qaeda, Dies at 78,” New York Times, June 16, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/world/middleeast/saudi-crown-prince-nayef-dies-led-crackdown-on-al-qaeda.html?pagewanted=all.
[3] “Nayef’s Conservative Policies to Outlive Him,” al-Jazeera, June 16, 2012,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/06/2012616185546905427.html%22.
[4] See Sa’ad al-Durayhim’s Twitter post, https://p.twimg.com/Aw_AxHCCAAAzPl8.jpg:large.
[5]
The Najd plateau is located in the central part of the Arabian
Peninsula. It is bordered on the west by Yemen and Hijaz, where the two
holy cities of Mecca and Medina are located; to the east by the Eastern
Province, where all Saudi oil fields are; and to the north by Iraq and
Jordan.
[6] The Six Books, Sahih al-Bukhari, tradition 1037, p. 81 and tradition 7094, p. 592.
[7] Hisham Sharabi, Neopatriarchy, A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society (Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 33-34.
[8] Muslim Brotherhood Official Website, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/.
[9] International Constitutional Law, http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/.
[10] The Six Books, Sahih Muslim, traditions 4746 to 4763, pp. 1007-08 and traditions 4782-4793, pp. 1009-10.
[11] “Saudi Police ‘Stopped’ Fire Rescue,” BBC News, March 15, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/1874471.stm.
[12] “Saudi Cleric Backs Gender Segregation with Fatwa,” al-Arabiya, February 24, 2010,
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/02/24/101355.html.
[13] “Egypt Scholars Demand Saudi Cleric Retract Fatwa,” al-Arabiya, February 25, 2010, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/02/25/101454.html.
[14]
The Six Books, Sahih Muslim, tradition 177, p. 688; Sunan Abi Dawud,
tradition 4340, p. 1539; and Sunan al-Nasa’i, traditions 5011 and 5012,
p. 2411.
[15] “Tunisia Says Constitution Will Not Cite Islamic Law,”
The New York Times, March 26, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/world/africa/tunisia-says-constitution-will-not-cite-islamic-law.html.
[16]
Al-Bukhari (d. 870), with 7,397 traditions; Muslim (d. 875), with 7,563
traditions; Ibn Maja (d. 886), with 4,341 traditions; Abu Dawud (d.
888), with 5,274 traditions; al-Tirmithi (d. 892), with 3,956
traditions; and al-Nasa’i (d. 915), with 5,761 traditions.
[17]
The Six Books, Sahih al-Bukhari, traditions 304, p. 26; 3241, p. 263;
5197 and 5198, p. 450; 6449, p. 542; and, 6546, p. 549; and Sahih
Muslim, traditions 6938 to 6942, p. 1152; and Jami al-Tirmithi,
tradition 2613, p. 1915.
[18] Sahih al-Bukhari, tradition 2658, p. 210.
[19] Ibid., tradition 1951, p. 152.
[20] “Turkey Strives for 21st Century form of Islam,” The Guardian, February 27, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/27/turkey.islam.
[21]
The Six Books, Sunan Abi Dawud, tradition 4253, p. 1532; Jami
al-Tirmithi, tradition 2167, p. 1869; and Sunan Ibn Maja, tradition
3950, p. 2713.
