Why Syria’s Regime is Likely to Survive, Temporarily
Examining the differences between the uprising in Syria and
those in Tunisia and Egypt offers important clues as to why Syria's regime is
likely to survive. The Tunisian and Egyptian armies refused to kill
demonstrators and even supported the revolution. Syria’s Alawi-led forces, on
the other hand, do not hesitate to kill, as the Tadmur and Hama massacres
show. The Syrian regime has been skillful at exploiting the conflict with
Israel and the patience of Western powers with the dictatorship. The Syrian
government has shown a strong ability to manipulate Islam for its benefit as
well. While these tools do not work as effectively as they used to, they still
give the Syrian government many advantages over its deposed counterparts in
Tunisia and Egypt.
POPULAR
UPRISINGS IN TUNISIA AND EGYPT
On December 17, 2010, Muhammad
Bouazizi, a 26-year-old vegetable street vendor from the poor town of Sidi
Bouzid, Tunisia (200 miles south of Tunis, the capital) set himself on fire in
front of the governor’s office, igniting a series of popular protests and
clashes with the police that engulfed the country. Bouazizi had been humiliated
by the confiscation of his vendor cart, and following the municipality’s
refusal to see him about the matter, he self-immolated. He died on January 4,
2010, as a result of his burns. Bouazizi’s actions sparked widespread protests
against President Zine al-Abidine bin Ali’s non-representative corrupt regime,
high unemployment, brutal security forces, and single political party
dictatorship, among other issues. Less than a month later, on January 14, 2011,
bin Ali fled to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, after 23 years of rule.
The Tunisian uprising was swift,
effective, and inspirational to the Arab masses everywhere. Within days,
Bouazizi had motivated men in a number of Arab countries to self-immolate as a
result of desperation over poverty, unemployment, repression, and corruption.
In Egypt, at least five men followed Bouazizi’s example, with one dead in
Alexandria.[i]
On January 25, 2011, a
few days after bin Ali’s flight, thousands of anti-government protesters
demanding the end of President Husni Mubarak’s almost 30-year rule clashed with
riot police in Tahrir Square in the center of Cairo. The protests spread to
other cities. During the first week of the demonstrations alone, the violence
resulted in some 300 deaths, according to UN estimates.[ii]
By February 5, 2011, President Mubarak
had announced a series of concessions. He replaced the cabinet, appointed a
vice-president for the first time, and declared that he would not run for
re-election for a sixth term in September 2011. He also replaced the politburo
of the ruling party, including his son Gamal, and pledged dialogue with
opposition parties.[iii] Earlier,
on January 31, 2011, the Egyptian army declared its respect for the legitimate
rights of the people, stating that it would not use force against protesters.
Egypt’s new vice-president, Umar Sulayman, invited all protest groups and
opposition parties for immediate negotiations on constitutional reform.[iv]
Six groups, including the banned Muslim Brothers organization, met with the
vice president for the first time on February 6, 2011. The participants agreed
to form a joint committee of judicial and political figures tasked with
proposing constitutional amendments.[v] On February
8, 2011, it was reported that 6 million public sector workers received a 15
percent pay increase.[vi] On February
11, 2011, President Mubarak resigned, handing over Egypt’s affairs to the high
command of the armed forces, headed by the defense minister.
In an Arab world ruled by dictatorial
monarchs and military presidents who--unless assassinated in a coup
d’état--typically remain in power for life, popular uprisings are alien. What
then is the possibility that the Tunisian and the Egyptian popular uprisings
will be copied in other Arab countries? This article addresses the question as
it relates to Syria.
COMPARING
SYRIA WITH TUNISIA AND EGYPT
Syrian President Bashar al-Asad, on one
hand, and Tunisia’s bin Ali and Egypt’s Mubarak, on the other, share common
characteristics but also differ in many regards. In all three countries, a
politicized military is the kingmaker, the supreme power. They have in common
non-representative, non-participatory governance; single political party
dictatorship; a rubber-stamp parliament; politicized judiciary; the absence of
press freedom; brigades of brutal security forces infamous for appalling
human-rights abuses; and a presidential cult of personality. They are also
alike in the rampant corruption, absence of transparency or accountability in
government finances, high unemployment, and huge disparities of income--poverty
for the great majority of the population and great wealth for the tiny minority
of the ruling elites and their business associates who violate the law with
impunity.
On the other hand, Syria’s Asad differs
from bin Ali’s Tunisia and Mubarak’s Egypt in three respects. It is these
differences that make a successful popular uprising leading to regime change in
Damascus unlikely, at least in the immediate future. First, Syria is ruled by
the Asad clan of the minority Alawi sect, unlike the former Sunni-majority-led
government under bin Ali. Second, Tunisia’s secularism differs greatly from
Asad exploitation of Sunni Islam. Last, the geopolitical environment dictates
different domestic and foreign agendas in Damascus and Tunis, especially regarding
the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The Asad regime in Syria also differs
from Egypt in three respects. Again, Syria’s Alawi-minority rule differs from
the Sunni majority-led government of former President Mubarak in Egypt. Second,
the Muslim Brotherhood organization in Syria is relatively weak, unlike the
well-organized and forceful Muslim Brothers organization in Egypt. Third, Syria
is in a state of war with Israel, whereas peaceful relations have existed
between Egypt and Israel since March 26, 1979.
Reducing the desire for major revolt in
Syria are memories of the hundreds killed by Hafiz Asad in Tadmur in 1980 and
the many thousands killed in Hama in 1982 (see below), and the fear of similar
savagery in 2011. Also sobering are reminders of the civil war in neighboring
Lebanon (1975-1990) and the destruction in Iraq since the 2003 U.S. occupation,
with more than a million Iraqi refugees in Syria. Further, a young Bashar Asad,
with a stylish British/Syrian wife, continues to give some people hope for
genuine reforms.
Damascus attributes the Tunisian
uprising to bin Ali’s reliance on “fair-weather foreign allies.”[vii] The Ba’th Party’s newspaper also predicted that
the uprising would restore Tunisia to its historical role as a supporter of
Arab national causes, especially the confrontation with Israel.[viii] Damascus’ rhetoric on Tunisia applies to Egypt as
well. Asad claims that Syria is insulated from popular uprisings because he
understands the needs of the Syrian people and his policies fulfill their
aspirations. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal on January 31,
2011, Asad said he was very closely linked to the beliefs of his people.[ix]
Notwithstanding
Syria’s government boasting that it does not rely on fair-weather foreign
allies, that it has always supported Arab national causes, and that Asad is
very closely linked to the beliefs of his people, just one week after bin Ali
fled Tunisia, Damascus released S£16 billion (US$360 million) in fuel subsidies
to state employees and retirees, granted S£12 billion (US$270 million) in
assistance to more than 400,000 poor families,[x] and rolled back price increases
announced earlier on certain pharmaceuticals.[xi] On February 17, 2011, the government
announced it would cut taxes on basic foodstuffs. On May 25, 2011, the price of
fuel oil dropped by 25 percent (from S£20 to S£15) per liter.[xii]
While
these actions may have been in the making for some time--as the government had
stated--the uprising in Tunisia must have accelerated their announcement. In
any event, the sudden generosity failed to buy peace. On March 18, 2011, a
popular uprising erupted in the southern city of Dara’a. The uprising quickly
spread to other cities as well. Tanks rolled into Banyas, Dara’a, Hama, Jabla,
Jisr al-Shughour, and Homs, among others. Within a few weeks, more than a
thousand citizens had been killed, thousands more injured, thousands fled to
neighboring Turkey, and many thousands were arrested and tortured.
Syria’s
regime is built upon three pillars--brutal sectarian security forces;
exploitation of Sunni Islam; and maintaining a state of no-peace, no-war with
Israel. In what follows, these characteristics will be discussed and related to
bin Ali’s Tunisia and Mubarak’s Egypt.
SYRIA’S ALAWITE MINORITY RULE AND THE READINESS OF ITS
SECURITY FORCES TO KILL DEMONSTRATORS
The
populations of Tunisia and Egypt are homogeneous. By contrast, Syria is home to
a colorful tapestry of religions, religious sects, and ethnicities, with a
sectarian minority in power since the mid-1960s.
Population
Composition in Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria
Tunisia’s
population of 11 million is 98 percent Arab, 98 percent Muslim,[xiii] and 98 percent Sunni Muslim.[xiv] The Tunisian army, being drawn from a
homogeneous non-sectarian society, struck a mortal blow to the bin Ali regime.
It refused to obey the president’s orders to shoot at protesters. In its
refusal, the army transformed Tunisia’s popular uprising into a coup d’état
against the president. In an interview with Le Parisien newspaper,
quoted by Reuters, Admiral Jacques Lanxade, a former French chief of staff and
later ambassador to Tunisia said, “The chief of staff of the land army, General
Rachid Ammar, resigned, refusing to get the army to open fire, and it is
probably he who advised Ben Ali to go, telling him 'You're finished'.”[xv]
Egypt’s
population of 81 million is, to a great degree, homogeneous--99.6 percent
Egyptian Arab, about 90 percent Muslim (mostly Sunni), and about 9 percent
Coptic.[xvi] The Egyptian army, being
non-sectarian, declared on January 31, 2011, that it respected the legitimate
rights of the people and would not use force against the protesters.[xvii]
Syria’s
population is around 23 million. Almost three-quarters of Syria’s population is Sunni
Muslim. There are minorities of Alawites, estimated at about 12 percent;
Christians, around 8 percent; Druze, some 3 percent; and Isma’ilis, around 2
percent. Arabs make up a majority of about 90 percent. Ethnic minorities of
Kurds, Armenians, and others make up the remaining ten percent.[xviii]
The
Asad clan has ruled Syria with brutality since the mid-1960s. It belongs to one
of the seven main tribes of the Alawi community, the Kalbiyya Tribe. The
Alawites are thought to be a heterodox Isma’ili sect, despised by orthodox
Sunnis. The famous Sunni theologian Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), condemned the
Alawites as being more dangerous than the Christians and encouraged Muslims to
conduct jihad against them.[xix] To many Alawi clerics, the howls of
jackals that can be heard at night are the souls of Sunni Muslims calling their
misguided coreligionists to prayer.[xx]
The
Alawites have inhabited Syria’s northern Mediterranean mountainous region since
the tenth century. Until Alawi officers took power in 1963, their homeland was
destitute. Poverty was so abject that poor families were compelled to send
their daughters, sometimes as young as ten years of age, to live and work for
paltry wages as housemaids in the homes of affluent families in nearby cities.
While other parts of rural Syria were also poor, the Alawi region was worse.
Centuries of Sunni persecution and neglect left deep scars on the collective
memory of this minority. To
put Syria’s rule in perspective, the historical progression of this minority’s
ascension to power would be useful.
Changes
to Syria’s Power Structure in the Twentieth Century
For
centuries, Syria’s wealthy urban Sunni families and notables enjoyed a
privileged position under the stratified society of Ottoman rule (1517–1918).
However, this came to end with the French mandate (1920–1946). The Syrian urban
elite had hoped to rule an independent Syria and thus supported the Arab Revolt
during World War I against the Turks, which eventually led to the Ottoman
defeat. However, in the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, France had secretly agreed
with Britain to divide natural Syria between Paris and London. As a result,
Syria’s embittered urban elite led the nationalist resistance against French
rule, driving France to rely on Syria’s ethnic and religious minorities. The
French recruited infantry and cavalry units composed exclusively of Alawites,
Armenians, Circassians, Druze, Isma’ilis, and Kurds.
After
the French left Syria in 1946, Damascus’ early governments were mainly composed
of the country’s urban notables. They resented a Syrian army composed of ethnic
and religious minorities left behind by the French. From 1946 to 1948, the size
of the army was reduced from 7,500 men to 2,500 men.[xxi] Army commanders reciprocated the
resentment, and the army became politicized. A series of military coups
followed.
During
the next 15 years, young Alawites, most of whom could not afford a university
education, sought careers in the military. The military academy in the city of
Homs offered free education and board in addition to a monthly salary. On March
8, 1963, Hafiz Asad, a 33-year-old air force captain along with five other low
to middle-ranking Alawi officers staged a coup d’état that seized power from
the legitimate government of President Nazim al-Qudsi and the country’s
democratically-elected parliament. Since then, Syria has been governed by an
illegitimate, non-representative Alawi minority dictatorship.
The
Asad clan has been in absolute power since 1970, when Hafiz Asad succeeded in
eliminating the last of his original five comrades. In March 1971, he was made
president in an uncontested referendum securing over 95 percent of the votes.
Four referendums followed, each for a seven-year term. Once again, Asad won
over 95 percent of the votes each time. Hafiz Asad died in 2000. Shortly after,
a constitutional amendment was enacted to lower the minimum eligibility age of
the president from 40 to 34 years, and Hafiz Asad’s son 34-year-old son Bashar
became president in a similar uncontested referendum Bashar followed his
father’s footsteps, securing 97.3 percent of the votes. In the May 27, 2007
uncontested referendum, the young president won another term, this time winning
97.62 percent of the votes.
A
Ruling Clan United
Syria
is a police state. At the heart of the Asad clan’s political and military
hegemony is a multiple above-the-law security services (Military Intelligence,
Air Force Intelligence, General Security Directorate, Political Security
Directorate, National Security Bureau, among others) infamous for cruelty and
appalling disregard for human rights. Stories of political opponents being
arrested never to be heard from again and of relatives of dissidents being
taken away as hostages so as to force them to surrender are abound. Trusted
Alawi officers occupy every position of importance in the security forces. They
control the important military units, especially in and around Damascus. The
president’s youngest brother, Maher, with a reputation of being unstable, heads
the Presidential Guard brigades.[xxii] Conceivably, an Alawi general/s could
stage a successful coup d’état against Bashar Asad, but that would not change
the regime’s sectarian nature.
The
Asad regime has long had a reputation of violence and cruelty. In response to the Muslim Brothers’ acts of violence against
the symbols of Alawi power between 1977 and 1982, Hafiz Asad sent 12,000
soldiers that crushed the Brothers in a horrifying massacre of historic
proportions. For three weeks in February 1982, Hafiz Asad’s military forces
pulverized Hama. Depending on the source, between 3,000--according to the
government and its apologists-- and well over 20,000--possibly 38,000,
according to Thomas Friedman[xxiii]--were killed,
tens of thousands injured, and entire city districts were demolished.
Earlier,
on June 27, 1980, the day after a failed Muslim Brotherhood assassination
attempt on Hafiz Asad, two units from the Defense Companies, controlled by
Hafiz’s brother Rifa’at, were let loose on the Tadmur prison in Palmyra, deep
in the desert, where Muslim Brothers were being held. The units were given
orders to kill everyone inside. “Some five hundred inmates died in cells
echoing to the fearful din of automatic weapons, exploding grenades, and dying
shrieks of ‘God is great.’” Shortly after, on July 8, 1980, membership in the
Muslim Brotherhood became a capital offense.[xxiv] In the aftermath of Hama, thousands of
Muslim Brothers migrated to Saudi Arabia, where they continue to live.
While
the world did not lift a finger and has quickly forgotten both the Hama and
Tadmur massacres, the Sunni masses, especially the Muslim Brothers, will
neither forgive nor forget. Self-preservation has driven the regime’s security
generals to act promptly, decisively, and viciously at the slightest hint of an
uprising.
The
Likelihood of a Successful Popular Uprising in Syria
Stirrings
on March 18, 2011, in the southern Syrian city of Dara’a resulted in the
killing of at least three demonstrators by the security forces.[xxv] Foreign reporters are banned from
entering Syria. By March 26, 2011, demonstrations had spread to other Syrian
cities, including Damascus suburbs, with 61 deaths confirmed.[xxvi] On April 25, 2011, the army entered
the city of Dara’a with tanks. A week later, tanks rolled into several towns near
Dara’a as well as Banyas, Hama, Jabla, Homs, and others. On May 11, 2011,
Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan revealed that, “more than 1,000 civilians
had died in Syria's upheaval.”[xxvii] The attack in mid-June 2011
on Jisr al-Shughour, near the Turkish border, has forced some 10,000 residents
to flee to Turkey. By August 1, 2011, the number of killed exceeded 1,600. Thousands were also injured and many more thousands were arrested
and tortured. Braving bullets, tanks, arrest, and torture, demonstrations have
grown in size and have become features of the noon prayer on Fridays and during
the burial rituals the next day in dozens of cities, towns, and villages. The barrier of fear has been removed. The demonstrators have been demanding loudly the removal of the Asad family tyranny.
On
May 18, the United States imposed sanctions on President Bashar Asad.[xxviii] On May 23, 2011, the European Union
imposed sanctions on the Syrian president.[xxix]
There
is little likelihood that Asad will engage in genuine reforms in order to end
the Ba’th Party’s monopoly on power, conduct democratically contested
parliamentary and presidential elections, ensure crude oil sector transparency,
and stop human rights abuses. Genuine reforms would put an end to the regime’s
hold on power, which would have serious consequences to the Alawi communities
and possibly the Christian minority as well. In his public address to the
parliament on March 30, 2011, Asad was defiant. He repeated the well-known
cliché used by the other Arab rulers that the protests against him were a
disguise for a foreign conspiracy to “fragment Syria… an Israeli agenda.” Asad insisted that Syria’s protesters
had been “duped” into damaging the nation on behalf of its enemies.[xxx] While acknowledging popular demands
for reform, he effectively declared that it would be either his regime or the
gun.
The
president’s speech on March 30, 2011, was reiterated by his notorious 41-year-old
billionaire cousin, Rami Makhlouf. Makhlouf has been under U.S. sanctions since
2008 for “manipulating the judicial system and using Syrian intelligence to
intimidate rivals.” In an interview with the New York Times reported on May
10, 2011, Makhlouf revealed the workings and thinking of the Asad family’s
inner circle. He warned, “Syria’s ruling elite, a tight-knit circle at the
nexus of absolute power… will fight to the end.” He continued, “The ruling
elite… had grown even closer during the crisis” and that “the decision of the
government now is that they decided to fight.” Makhlouf, who holds no official
position, further postured, “If there is no stability here, there’s no way
there will be stability in Israel.”[xxxi]
The
Asad regime is likely to survive this round of protests. To choke the
rebellion, Syria’s security units have been shooting to kill demonstrators and
torturing those arrested. Slim as it may be, however, the demonstrators have
hope on two fronts. First, should the demonstrations persist and spread to
downtown Damascus and Aleppo, the security forces would be overwhelmed,
rendering a Hama or a Palmyra-type atrocity more difficult, especially before a
world audience on the internet, Facebook, and YouTube. If the demonstrations
continue and become more widespread, more Sunni clerics would join the
uprising. Ultimately, the demonstrations could increase enough for even the
palace ulama to turn against their benefactor. Second, if units of the army,
which is a conscripted institution, refuse to kill citizens or if the army
stands up to the republican guards and the intelligence brigades, the regime
might very well collapse. Like a pressure cooker, the longer the Asad
dictatorship survives, the greater the revenge of the masses will be.
Minority
sectarian tyrannies cannot rule forever. Now that the barrier of fear has been
broken, discontent and poverty could drive Syrians to revolt for the second,
third, and fourth times until the Asad regime is overthrown. Syria’s high population
growth rates mean that 48 percent of Syria’s population today is under 19 years
of age, and 58 percent is under the age of 24 years.[xxxii] Billions of dollars, which Syria does
not have, are needed for investment in basic infrastructure, including new schools;
universities; hospitals; housing--with electricity and water that run all the
time, not a third of the time, as the case is in most cities today; and in
economic stimulus initiatives to create hundreds of thousands of new jobs. In
the absence of substantial foreign aid, Syria’s per capita GDP is unlikely to
grow sufficiently to keep the masses of the poor off the streets for too long.
Hafiz
Asad has saddled the Alawi community with a terrible burden. Does Bashar Asad
endanger the Alawites more by maintaining his regime or by ending his family's
40-year-long rule?
THE SYRIAN REGIME’S ISLAMIC AGENDA
As
the only secular country in the region, Tunisia is unique in the Arab world.
Bin Ali’s tight embrace of state secularism denied him the right to invoke those
parts of the Koran and the Sunna that demand blind obedience to the Muslim
ruler. In the case of Egypt, on the other hand, the country’s Sunni leadership
has chosen to promote Sunni Islam. As for Syria, the Alawi leadership is neither
secular nor sincere in its promotion of the Sunni creed. To President Asad,
Islam is a strategy for blackmail legitimacy--a tool to mollify the Sunni
majority and to use the Islamist alternative to frighten Syria’s Christian and
other minorities as well as Israel and the Western powers.
Tunisia’s
Separation of Islam from the State
Despite
its population being almost entirely Sunni Muslim, Tunisia is the only secular
Arab country. For a half a century, there has been a separation between Islam
and the state. Tunisia’s first president, Habib Bourguiba (in office from July
1957 until November 1987), was the most avowedly secularist leader in the Arab
world. To Bourguiba, Islam symbolized the past; modernity represented the
future. Bourguiba was careful to secularize within the framework of a modernist
reading of Islam. He presented reforms as the product of ijtihad
(individual philosophical reasoning of Shari’a), not a break with Islam. He
implemented a genuine program of secularization and modernization, abolishing
Shari’a courts and polygamy. He reformed education and banned the headscarf for
women. Bin Ali followed in Bourguiba’s
footsteps.[xxxiii]
Egypt’s Islamic Credentials
Ninety percent of Egypt’s population is Muslim, mainly Sunni.
Egyptian Muslims have a strong attachment to Islam. An international survey of 68
states conducted by Gallup International for the BBC World Service program Who
Runs Your World found that 87 percent of Egyptians named religion as their
most important defining characteristic, giving Egypt the most robust religious
identity of any country surveyed.[xxxiv] Given the affinity of the great
majority of Egyptians to Islam, Cairo’s government promotes the Islamic creed.
Article 2 of the 1971 constitution, as amended in 1980, 2005, and 2007, names
Islam as the religion of the state and Shari’a law as the principal source of
legislation.[xxxv]
The Mubarak administration precluded the Muslim Brotherhood
from openly fielding candidates in Egyptian elections. In response, the
Brothers ran as independents. In the November-December 2005 elections, the
organization became the major parliamentary opposition, winning 88 seats, or 20
percent.[xxxvi]
Syria’s Exploitation of the Islamic Creed
Syria
is neither secular nor sincere in its promotion of the Sunni creed. Syria’s
promotion of Sunni Islam contradicts the ruling
Ba’th Party’s secular constitution but is politically convenient. The party’s holy trinity is Arab unity, freedom,
and socialism. There is no mention of Islam in the Ba’th constitution.[xxxvii] The regime uses five main strategies with
regards to Islam, all which show its lack of sincerity toward its secular
roots.
The
first strategy is the enshrinement of Islam in the constitution, promulgated in
1973 under Hafiz Asad.[xxxviii] Article 3.1 makes Islam the necessary
religion of the president. Article 3.2 names Islam “a main source” of
legislation. Having failed to abolish articles 3.1 and 3.2 and to remove a
barrier to his presidency, in 1973, Hafiz Asad appealed to Imam Musa al-Sadr,
an influential cleric and head of the Higher Shi’i Council in Lebanon, to issue
a fatwa that the Alawites were indeed a community of Shi’i Islam.[xxxix] Sadr consented.
The
second strategy is to safeguard the country’s Shari’a laws and courts in
personal status, family, and inheritance affairs (non-Muslims follow their own
religious courts). Shari’a law is the antithesis of the liberal laws of the
modern age. It denies women many legal rights and impinges on their human
rights--a Muslim man can marry four wives and divorce any one of them without
giving reason (with limited child custody rights, housing, or alimony), a
Muslim woman is prohibited from marrying a non-Muslim man while the Muslim man
is allowed to marry non-Muslim women, a woman cannot pass her nationality on to
her foreign husband and children while the man can, the punishment for “honor
killings” of women by male relatives is only a light sentence, and two women
equal one man in legal testimony, witness, and inheritance. Nonetheless, the
regime, its apologists, and public relations propagandists have made great
efforts to project at home and abroad an image of secularism, modernity, and
equality between the genders.
The
third strategy is the use of an Islamic curriculum in Syrian elementary,
middle, and high schools. Muslim students are taught Sunni Islam regardless of
the Islamic sect to which they belong. The textbooks do not contain a single
reference to the beliefs or interpretations of the Islamic creed according to
the doctrines of the Alawi, Isma’ili, or Druze minorities.
The
fourth strategy is to flaunt the regime’s Islamic image on religious occasions.
During Islamic feasts, the president is sure to attend prayers in Damascus’
famous Umayyad Mosque to media fanfare. Religious events are national holidays.
During the month of Ramadan, government and private offices have different
working hours and close early. Special religious programming takes over the
airwaves on government radio and television. More mosques, larger
congregations, and a greater number of veiled women than ever before have
become the order of the day in Syrian cities. Under the direction of President
Bashar Asad, a special rain prayer was even performed throughout Syria's
mosques on December 10, 2010. This is a far cry from the secular vision of the Ba’th
Party’s founding fathers.
In
order to gain support from the Sunni palace ulama and to mollify the Sunni
street following the violent confrontations in March 2011 between the security
forces and protestors in several Syrian cities, Asad attempted to appease the
Sunni community. Popular Sunni cleric Muhammad Sa’id al-Bouti praised Asad’s
positive response to many of the requests submitted to the government by a
number of Sunni clerics. For example, on April 5, 2011, in his weekly religious
program airing on Syrian government television, Shaykh al-Bouti applauded Asad
for readmitting niqab-wearing (black face cover) female teachers to the
classroom, after they had been transferred to desk duties in July 2010.[xl] Interestingly, al-Bouti had previously
attributed the drought in December 2010 to their removal from the classroom. Shaykh
al-Bouti also praised Asad for the formation of the Sham Institute for Advanced
Shari’a Studies and Research, and for the establishment of an Islamic satellite
television station dedicated to proclaiming the message of “true” Islam.[xli] In another gesture, Syria’s first and
only casino, which had enraged Islamists when it opened on New Year’s Eve 2011,
was closed.[xlii]
The
fifth strategy is support of the Sunni Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the Shi’i Hizballah
in Lebanon, and of theocratic Iran. This strategy not only demonstrates the
regime’s commitment to Islamist causes but also politicizes Islam in the
domestic discourse.
What is the reason for the regime’s exploitation of
Islam? Since the Asad clan belongs to the heterodox Alawi
minority sect, appeasement of the Sunni majority works in Asad’s favor. Instead
of wading in the muddy waters of Shari’a reform and secularization, as called
for in the Ba’th Party constitution, the regime has chosen a more beneficial
strategy: to uphold the influence of Islam and to appoint as many Sunnis as
possible to high government positions--though excluding those in the elite
security forces.
ISLAM’S
APPEAL TO MUSLIM DICTATORSHIPS
The
Koran and the Sunna enjoin Muslims to obey the Muslim ruler blindly. In verse 4:59,
the Koran orders, “Obey God and obey God’s messenger and obey those of
authority among you.” The effects of this verse transcend all layers of
hierarchy--the male over the female, the father over the children and wife (or
wives), the teacher over the student, the employer over the employee, the ruler
over the ruled, and so forth. Sunna traditions amplify the Koran. In response
to the question of how a Muslim should react to a ruler who does not follow the
true guidance, Muhammad reportedly said, according to Sahih Muslim: “He
who obeys me obeys God; he who disobeys me, disobeys God. He who obeys the
ruler, obeys me; he who disobeys the ruler, disobeys me.”[xliii] This and similar wording appears two
dozen times in Sahih Muslim. Abi Da’ud (d. 888) and Ibn Maja (d. 886)
quote Muhammad as imploring Muslims to hear and obey the ruler, even if he were
an Ethiopian slave.[xliv] Al-Bukhari (d. 870) quotes similar
traditions.[xlv] In addition, the palace ulama invoke the
thousand-year-old opinions of famous jurists such as al-Ghazali (1058-1111),
Ibn Jama’a (1241-1333), and Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328). These men taught that the
Muslim ruler must be obeyed blindly, because even an unjust ruler is better
than societal unrest.
Like
other Arabs, the Syrians’ embrace of Islam is tight. The Koran describes the
Arab race as the “best race evolved to mankind” (3:110). Muhammad, his
companions, the Koran, and the holy Muslim sanctuaries in Mecca, Medina, and
Jerusalem are all Arabic. Arabs feel they are the guardians of an Arabic
religion. In addition, political frustrations at home and abroad during the
past half-century have been drawing most Arabs closer to Islam.
The
Syrian masses are obsessed with the belief in predestination, a core belief in
the Islamic creed. Generally, Muslims attribute all good and bad in life to the
will of God. Bad rulers are accepted as if they were ordained by God’s will. Islam
has thus become a psychological weapon in the hands of the Asad regime. The
palace ulama threaten the Muslim faithful with eternal damnation if they fail
to obey the president (wali al-amr). Shaykh al-Bouti has been
energetically calling upon the demonstrators to “repent to God” and to stop
demonstrating against the Asad regime.
THE RELIGIOUS FOUNDATION BEHIND
THE ISLAMISTS’ REBELLION
While
verse 4:59 has a strong influence on the majority of the masses gross
injustice, torture of political prisoners, abject poverty, high unemployment,
and rampant corruption cannot be tolerated forever. Ultimately, there comes a
breaking point that makes calls for rebellion against tyranny appealing. That
breaking point was reached in Tunisia on December 17, 2010, when Muhammad
Bouazizi burned himself to death; and in Egypt, on January
25, 2011, when thousands
of Egyptian anti-government protesters clashed with riot police in Cairo’s
Tahrir Square. Inspired by Tunis and Cairo, popular uprisings erupted in
Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, and Syria.
Sunna
traditions sanction rebellion against the Islamic ruler if he becomes impious
or unjust. Sahih Muslim as well as hadiths collected by Abu Dawud and
Ahmad bin Shuayb al-Nasai attribute to Muhammad the saying, “Whoever of you
sees an evil action, let him change it with his hand; and if he is not able to
do so, then with his tongue; and if he is not able to do so, then with his
heart.”[xlvi] The two contradictory edicts were
invoked in mosques during Friday’s prayer in Tripoli, Libya on February 25,
2011, in the midst of the popular uprising that started on February 17, 2011,
against Colonel Qaddafi's 42-year rule. In one mosque, a pro-Qaddafi cleric
called upon his congregation to obey Colonel Qaddafi (wali al-amr) in order to accord with verse 4:59. In another mosque,
an anti-Qaddafi cleric implored his congregation to rise against the colonel in
order to accord with the prophetic tradition to change evildoers. Anti-Qaddafi
clerics both in and outside Libya have called upon the faithful to disobey
Colonel Qaddafi. Likewise in Syria, while the Sunni palace ulama order
obedience to Bashar Asad, opposing Sunni ulama urge rebellion against him.
THE
LIKELIHOOD FOR ARAB DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
What
is the likelihood that popular uprisings will usher democratic rule to Arab
countries? Aside from minor reforms, the short answer is that it is unlikely.
To rise against poverty, corruption, and injustice is one thing; to democratize
and prosper is a different matter. Three main factors may be cited as obstacles
to democracy and prosperity in the Arab world; namely, certain interpretations
of Islam, the palace ulama, and the military generals.
For
democracy and prosperity to evolve, Islam must be separated from the state. Arabs need a combination of a Martin Luther and a Kemal Ataturk. Democracy is not only free elections. Democracy is also equality for all
citizens--equality of women with Muslim men and equality of Christian citizens
and other minorities with Muslims. Islam discriminates against women and
non-Muslims.
How
likely is it that Islam be separated from the Arab state? This too is unlikely,
due to the affinity of the great majority of Arabs towards Islam. Popular
uprisings thus would not separate Islam from the Arab state. They might lead to
free elections, but not to equality among all citizens. Uprisings might also
end the state of emergency, but would not lead to the replacement of seventh
century Shari'a courts and family law with a modern legal system and family
code. Uprisings could institute presidential term limits, but would not
substitute the Islamic school curriculum with the teaching of comparative
religions or ethics. Uprisings might also lead to transparency in state
affairs, but not the belief in free will and science to replace the belief in
predestination.
The
palace ulama will maintain their dogmatic teaching in schools, mosques, and the
media. They will persist in cementing those calibrated interpretations of the Koran and
the Sunna that suit the political agendas of the governments they serve.
They will also continue persecuting those with ideas and interpretations that
differ from the sanctioned discourse. In addition, Arab military generals will
remain the kingmakers. They will not take orders from civilian politicians.
THE GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
Syria’s
geographic proximity to Israel plays a major role in its domestic and foreign
politics. By contrast, Tunisia, being a good distance from the immediate
theatre of the Arab-Israeli conflict, is not as closely wedded to the dispute
at the government or the popular levels as Syria. As for Egypt, the country
signed a peace treaty with Israel on March 26, 1979, and the two governments
normalized relations. The Egyptian masses, however, remain cool to the treaty,
frustrated by the lack of progress in peace negotiations between Israel and
other Arab parties.
Israel
and the occupation of the Golan Heights since 1967 make the Arab-Israeli
conflict a core issue in Syria’s domestic and foreign politics. The Asad regime
promotes the confrontation with Israel as Syria’s, and the Arab world’s,
greatest duty to support. Asad projects himself as the leading defender of Palestinian
rights, Arab honor, and Syria’s sovereignty. To Damascus, the Arab-Israeli
conflict has become the benchmark against which patriotism is measured. Syrians
are not likely to rise against the Asad regime over this issue, despite its
huge financial burden and the curtailment of personal liberties in Syria, which
in the event produced little other than under-development and poverty.
A
daily diet of nationalistic rhetoric helps mobilize the masses behind the Asad
regime. The long list of restrictions in Syria in the name of the confrontation
with Israel is in reality a means to secure the regime's hold on power and to
maintain the privileged status and wealth of the country’s leaders and their
relatives. Free press is banned. Advocates of reform are imprisoned
indefinitely without trial or accused of the absurd charge of weakening the
nation’s spirit. The conflict justifies allocating a substantial proportion of
the country’s scarce resources in order to maintain a huge standing army, which
has performed poorly in all of its confrontations with Israel and with no hope
of improvement in the future.
Meanwhile,
desperately needed investment in infrastructure, health, and education is
ignored. As for military spending, not even the parliament can ask any questions.
The confrontation justifies lack of transparency and accountability in state
finances, particularly crude oil revenues and spending--a black box of dark
secrets. It also means prison and torture for whoever criticizes or raises questions
regarding the legitimacy of the regime, sectarianism, the Ba’th Party, the
president and his family, the military, the security machine, human rights,
Syria’s politics in Lebanon, government finances, and the conflict with Israel
(save for the official line). A steady diet of exaggerated and invented
victories provides psychic rewards. Like its exploitation of Sunni Islam, the
Asad regime has turned the conflict with Israel into a security pillar to
control the masses and prolong its hold on power.
With
such a state of affairs, the question becomes how a future peace treaty with
Israel, if ever achieved, might affect the nature of Syria’s police state. Will
such a treaty lead to vocal demands by the people for an investigation into the
Asad family’s wealth; or lead to democratically contested presidential
elections with term limits; or to a major reduction in the military budget and
size of the army; or to a true accounting of the country’s oil revenues? The
regime’s response would test its level of commitment and desire to end the
state of no-war, no-peace with Israel. It is, however, highly unlikely that Asad
would be willing to sacrifice domestic control in return for a peace with
Israel, regardless how attractive to Asad Israel's terms might be.
ISLAMISM AS A MEANS TO FRIGHTEN WESTERN GOVERNMENTS
Damascus
plays the Islamist card effectively. For Asad, the threat of an Islamist
takeover in Damascus has become an instrument of blackmail legitimacy. Asad
allows the Islamist threat to remain sufficiently alive but too weak to pose a
serious threat to the regime itself. Islamists are regularly rounded up, and
since 1980, membership in the Muslim Brotherhood has been punishable by death.
Post-September
11, there has been the fear that Islamist regimes could polarize their
differences with Western cultures and politics. The U.S. war on terror granted
Arab rulers an added lease on life. America needs the cooperation of Arab
rulers in this fight.
NOTES
[i] “Egyptian Workers Burn
Themselves to Protest Transfers,” al-Masry al-Youm, January 21,
2011,
[viii]
“Tunisia’s Revolution… From the
Authoritarian State to the Nationalistic State,” al-Baath,
January 23, 2011,
http://www.albaath.news.sy/user/?id=1044&a=92552.
[xi]
“Fearing Street Reaction, Ministry of
Health Reverses Decision to Raise Prices,” All4Syria, January 25, 2011,
[xii] “The Government Reduces
the Price of Fuel Oil from S£20 to S£15 per Liter,” All4Syria, May 25, 2011,
[xix]
Patrick Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the
Middle East (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1995),
p. 10.
[xxi] Philip Khoury, Syria and the
French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945 (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 629.
[xxii] “Bashar al-Assad's Inner Circle,” BBC, April 27, 2011,
[xxiii] Thomas Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem (London: Harpers Collins, 1998), chapter
4.
[xxiv] Seale, Asad, the Struggle for
the Middle East, pp. 329-34.
[xxvi] Mark Landler, “Unrest in Syria and Jordan Poses New Test for U.S.
Policy,” New York Times, March 26, 2011,
[xxvii]
Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Syrian Tanks Shell Towns with at Least 19 Killed,”
Reuters, May 11, 2011,
[xxxi] Anthony Shahid, “Ally of Assad Says Syria Will Fight Protests Till
‘the End’,” New York Times, May 10, 2011,
[xxxiii]
United Nations Development Program--Program on Governance in the Arab Region, Tunisia:
Conditions of Women,
http://www.pogar.org/countries/gender.asp?cid=20.
[xxxiv] “Mid-East Extremes in
Power Survey,” BBC, September 14, 2005,
[xxxvii] The Constitution of the Baath Arab Socialist Party,
[xxxix]
Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle
East, p. 173.
[xli] “The Leadership Responded
Positively to the Demands of the Men of Religion,” Syria Steps,
April 6, 2011,
[xliii] The Six Books Sahih Muslim, traditions 4746 to 4763, pp.
1007-08 and traditions 4782 to 4793, pp. 1009-10.
[xliv] Ibid.;
Sunan Abi Da’ud, tradition 4607, p. 1561; and Sunan Ibn Maja,
tradition 42, p. 2479.
[xlv] Ibid.; Sahih al-Bukhari, traditions 7137 and 7142, p. 595.
[xlvi] Ibid.; Sahih Muslim,
tradition 177, p.688; Sunan Abi Da’ud,
tradition 4340, p. 1539; and Sunan
al-Nasai, tradition 5011 and 5012, p. 2411.
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