The 1916 Revolt of Sharif Hussein bin Ali Against the
Ottoman Empire
October 2009
As Turkish Syrian relations improve it is worthy to recall how Sharif Hussein's revolt in 1916 against the Ottoman Empire separated Greater Syria and Iraq from Turkey after four centuries of Ottoman rule.
On June 10, 1916,
in the midst of World War I (1914-1918), Sharif Hussein bin Ali fired the first
symbolic shot from his palace towards the Jeroul Turkish military base in Mecca;
thus launching the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Government of the Committee
of Union and Progress (CUP). The aim of the revolt, as described in Sharif Hussein’s
almost 2,500-word declaration on June 26, 1916 was the“complete separation and the independence
of the Hijaz, the Arabs, and Arab countries from the Ottoman Empire.[1]
Great Britain was the main supporter behind the revolt militarily and
financially. This cataclysmic event determined the shape of the map of the
Middle East; possibly even the outcome of the WWI.
This article
will discuss three issues relating to Sharif Hussein’s revolt between the early
1900s and the end of WWI: Arab attitude towards Ottoman rule, Sharif Hussein’s agenda,
and Sharif Hussein’s dealings with British officials.
Arab Attitude Towards
Ottoman Rule
On March 15,
1916, less than three months before the revolt and 16 months after WWI had
started, Sharif Hussein telegrammed Enver Pasha, Minister of Defense in
Istanbul, outlining his price to support Istanbul in the war. Among others, he
demanded decentralized rule for Syria and Iraq, not separation.[2]
In so doing, Sharif Hussein reflected the political aspirations of most Arabs. The political
platforms of six of the better-known reform parties, societies, and groupings
formed during the early 1900s will shed light on Arab political aspirations at
that time.Although,
each one of these groupings was limited in size to some tens of activist members,
may be hundreds, rather than thousands, drawn from the small body of the educated
Arab elite at that time, these parties are our only window on the
limited scale of organized Arab public opinion during that era.
The Al-Fatat Society
(Young Arab Society)
This Society was
ultra-secret. Founded in Paris on November 14, 1909 by a group of Arab
students, its purpose was to obtain Arab independence within the framework of a
bi-racial Ottoman Empire, Arab and Turk, on lines similar to the
Austro-Hungarian Empire, without breaking down the unity or destroying the
existence of the Ottoman Empire.[3]
Formed in Cairo
in 1912 with the knowledge of the Ottoman Government, this party was open to
Ottomans, Arabs and non-Arabs. Its objective was safeguarding the Ottoman
Empire from outside pressure and internal conflicts and the rallying of its
peoples round the focal center of the Empire’s unity, the Ottoman Throne.[4]
The General
Reform Society for Beirut
Formed in 1912, it sought reforms within the framework of the Ottoman
Empire, not outside it. The preamble to its program defined the Ottoman
Government as a constitutional representative government. The First Article
stated that the external affairs of the Vilayet (district) of Beirut were to be
in the hands of the Central Administration, while the internal affairs were to
be placed under the General Council of the Vilayet.[5]
The Qahtania
Secret Society
Founded at the
end of 1909, its objective was to turn the Ottoman Empire into a dual monarchy,
Arab and Turkish with the Ottoman Sultan wearing in addition to his Turkish
crown, the crown of the Arab kingdom.[6]
Al-Ahd Secret
Society
Formed in
October 1913, this society was established by Arab military officers serving in
the Ottoman armed forces, a high proportion of whom were from Iraq. Al-Ahd had
decentralization, not independence as objective. Nouri As-Saiid, a founding
member of Al-Ahd, a military commander in the revolt, and 13 times Prime
Minister of Iraq until his murder in the 1958 coup in Baghdad, wrote in 1947: “None
of us thought of separation from the Ottoman Empire but our mind was focused on
obtaining local Arab administration with Arabic as an official language along
with partnership with the Turks in the management of the government.”[7]
The Arab
Congress in Paris
Met on June
18-23, 1913, the Congress was the first public demonstration of Arab
anti-Ottoman sentiment. It was attended by representatives of political parties
and Lebanese and Syrian immigrant in the US and Mexico.
The Congress was
sufficiently serious for the CUP government to send emissaries to Paris to
negotiate with its leaders. In July, the Turkish Government announced that a
13-article agreement had been reached to give the Arab provinces a measure of
autonomy. The main concessions were: 1) At least three Cabinet ministers were
to be Arabs. 2) In time of peace the recruits are to do their military service
in their own locality. 3) In regions where the majority of the population
speaks Arabic, that language is to be the medium of instruction in all schools.
4) All officials in Arab provinces must be acquainted with Arabic as well as
Turkish.[8]
Although, there
was not even an allusion to “separation”, the Paris Congress was, nonetheless,
opposed by certain Arab quarters because, in their opinion, it had gone too far
against the Ottoman Empire. Al-Mukattam, a leading newspaper in Cairo, reported
on September 4, 1913 that a second delegation from Syria visited government
officials in Istanbul and accused the Paris delegates of being unpatriotic and
planning to destroy the Caliphate, Islam, and the Muslims.[9]The French Charge d’Affaires in
Istanbul wrote to the French Consul General in Damascus on June 10, 1913 how the
Turkish newspapers publish with “liveliest satisfaction” the telegrams sent to
them from Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut and other principal Arab cities to protest
against the Paris meeting and how the ulama and the notables of Medina refer to
the party of Al-Lamarkaziah (administrative decentralization) as a group of
traitors.[10]
Loyalty to
Istanbul was expressed on a different level as well. Arab soldiers among the
prisoners of war captured by the British army during WWI and held in India,
refused to join Sharif Hussein’s revolt. Out of 2,100 soldiers who arrived at
the Red Sea Port of Rabigh on December 1, 1916 from Bombay only 6 officers and
27 enlisted men agreed to disembark and join the revolt in spite of 4 days of
concerted effort by officers of the revolt army, led by Nouri As-Saiid, to persuade
the POWs to change their mind.[11]
Although, a variety of reasons might be attributed to their refusal, opposition
to the revolt was undoubtedly one of the reasons.
On the other
hand, there were some Arabs who felt that the Paris Congress did not go far
enough. A deputation arrived in Constantinople to insist on a wider basis of
agreement. But, there is no evidence that even members of this delegation
desired separation.[12]
Arab Christians
attitude
The extreme
anti-Turkish attitude was more the preserve of Arab Christians than Muslims. Separation
from the Ottoman Empire became the aim of Arab Christians by the middle of the
19th Century, especially among the Maronites in Mount Lebanon. Feeding
Christian resentment were the inequities of the Millet system that made non-Muslims
second class citizens; the 1860 massacres of Christians in Mount Lebanon and
Damascus; Christian missionary education, the printing press, the presence and
then return of immigrants to America, and the ideas of the French Revolution that
came with Napoleon’s interlude (1798-1801) in Egypt and Palestine; and protection
by foreign powers of Christians. The dispatch from the Earl of Aberdeen to
Consul Rose in Beirut aptly explains British attitude towards Christians and
the Port: “I have to inform you that Her Majesty’s Government perfectly approve
of your affording general and efficient protection to all Christians in Turkey
who may appeal to you against the oppression of the Musulman authorities of the
Port”.[13]
Arab Muslims
Loyalty to Ottoman Rule
Arab Muslims (most Arabs are Sunnis)
remained loyal to Sunni Ottoman rule for the four centuries since Sultan Selim I
(1512-1520) conquered most of the Arab world. Islamic brotherhood between Arab
and Turk and the rather good treatment the Turks accorded their Arab subjects,
at least until the arrival of the Young Turks in 1909, could explain Muslim Sunnis
loyalty.
Brotherhood in
Islam
Quranic and
Hadith injunctions created among Ottomans and Arabs bonds of brotherhood transcending
national, linguistic, and ethnic boundaries. The Quran dictates in verse 4.59:
“Obey God and obey the apostle and those of authority among you”. Verse 49.13
declares that: “The most pious amongst you is God’s dearest”. The Prophet had
reportedly said, according to the Hadith compilations of Abi Dawoud (d. 888) and
Al-Bukhari (d. 879) “I command to you fear of God, and to hear and obey, even
an Abyssinian slave”. Answering a question as to how a Muslim should react to
an emir or an imam who does not follow the true guidance, the Prophet is
reported to have said, according to Muslim (d. 874): “Hear and obey the emir,
even if your back is whipped and your property is taken; hear and obey”. Also,
according to Muslim, the Prophet reportedly said: “He who obeys me obeys God;
he who disobeys me, disobeys God. He who obeys the ruler, obeys me; he who
disobeys the ruler, disobeys me”.
Decent Treatment of
Arabs by Turks
The Ottoman era
in Arab lands (1517-1918) may be divided into two parts; namely, the first 300
years and the remaining 100 years.
The First 300
Years
By virtue of
their Islamic roots, wrote H. R. Gibb and H. Bowen, the Arabs were “regarded by
the Ottoman ruling class, at least at the beginning, with a certain deference
which they did not accord to the rest of the Sultan’s domain for the reason
that its inhabitants did speak the sacred language”.[14]
Amin Saiid described the relationship between Arabs and Turks up to 1908 as
follows: “The Ottoman Sultans respected the Arabs and treated their leaders and
ulama with graciousness and consideration. They were appointed to important
positions so that some became ministers and governors working along side their
Turkish brothers in the service of the State, with ability being the sole
discriminating factor in favor of Arab over Turk or Turk over Arab and, thus
grew the bond of sincerity and loyalty between two nations united in their
religion, land and mutual interest”.[15]
Upon his
conquest of Syria and Egypt in 1517, Sultan Selim I maintained the previous governor
of Damascus in his position. In Lebanon, the Sultan confirmed the feudal lords
who paid homage to him such as the Emirs of the Mountains, Kisrawan, Jubail,
and Tripoli. In Egypt, he kept changes to a minimum, aside from a Pasha
supported by a Janissary force of 5,000 men.
Ottoman
officials did not attempt to assimilate with the local population. Indeed, they
had little time to establish roots. During the 280 years of direct Ottoman rule
of Egypt, 100 pashas succeeded one another; or, an average of 2.8 years each. Between
1517-1697 133 pashas, an average of less than 1.5 years each, were assigned to
Damascus.[16]
Maintaining the local
old holders of power in their positions meant that old rivalries, tribal feuds,
and conflicts were carried over. Consequently, conditions in Arab lands remained to a
great extent a product of the old local politics of Arab notables and leaders; now,
however, subordinate to a new Pasha and a bureaucratic elite from Istanbul.
The Final 100
Years
Sultan
Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) adopted Islam as his state ideology to rally the
millions of Muslims in Western countries and colonies, especially in Great
Britain, on his side. To prove his Islamic credentials the Arab provinces were
paid a special attention. Amin Saiid wrote; “Sultan Abdulhamid worked during
his long reign, which lasted a whole generation, on attracting the Arabs,
keeping them satisfied and on removing every hint of ethnic discrimination
against them. He brought them close to the center of power and opened his doors and
treasures to them so they lived in peace and contentment”.[17]
Nouri As-Saiid wrote in 1943: “In the Ottoman Empire, Arabs, as Muslims were
regarded as partners of the Turks. They shared with the Turks both rights and
responsibilities, without any racial distinction: the higher appointments of
State, whether military or civil, were open to the Arabs”.[18]
Sultan Abdulhamid's Islamic credentials were also enhanced with the building of the 2,350-kilometer Hijaz railway, which was paid for in part by
Muslim contributions and from the meager resources of an
imperial treasury, which had defaulted on its obligations in 1875.
However, during
the rule of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) between 1909 and the
revolt of Sharif Hussein in 1916, the Arab provinces were subjected to a reign
of humiliation, mainly as a result of the Turkification policies of the CUP
government. It was during this period that Arab organizations grew steadily
seeking decentralized rule. A good deal of the grievances listed by Sharif
Hussein in his almost 2,500 word Declaration on June 26, 1916, were concerned
with the poor Islamic credentials of the CUP and their secularization policies.
It is true that
the condition of the Arab provinces at the end of WWI was pathetic in terms of low
income, high illiteracy, poor health care, and primitive infrastructure. But,
so were the conditions of the rest of the Empire.
Sharif Hussein’s Agenda
Sultan
Abdulhamid II removed Sharif Hussein from Mecca to Istanbul in 1893 when he was
about 40 years of age in order to stop his meddling in the affairs of the Mecca
Emirate.[19]
Sharif Hussein and his family were kept in exile under the watchful eye of the Sultan's security men in Istanbul until 1908. He had
four sons: Ali, Abdullah, Faisal, and Zaid.
Sharif Hussein
coveted the position of Emir, or Sharif, of Mecca. Despite his bidding,
however, Sultan Abdulhamid II bypassed him on three occasions; in 1880, when he
appointed Abdulmuttalib of the Zaid clan instead; in 1882 when he named Aoun
Rafiq, and in 1905 when he appointed a cousin of the Sharif, Ali bin Abdullah.[20]
In October 1908, following the second constitutional revolution of July 23,
1908, the CUP removed Ali bin Abdullah from his post and appointed in his place
an old uncle of Sharif Hussein;who died before assuming
the post. With the help of Sharif Hussein’s son Abdullah,[21]
Ali bin Abdullah took refuge in Cairo, under British protection.[22]
Now that the
position of Emir of Mecca became vacant, Sharif Hussein lobbied Sultan
Abdulhamid II, via the Grand Vizier, Kamel Pasha, for the post, claiming that the
Emirate of Mecca should become his because he was “the eldest member of the
Hashimite family”.[23]Following an encouraging response from Kamel Pasha, an audience was
arranged for the next day with the Sultan, during which Sharif Hussein was
appointed Emir of Mecca.[24]The date was November 24, 1908.
Who appointed Sharif
Hussein to the Emirate of Mecca?
The role of three
parties in this appointment will be examined: The Imperial Palace, the Porte (seat of Ottoman
government) and the British Embassy.
The Imperial Palace
In the confused
early months of the second constitutional period, a crisis of authority gripped
Istanbul. The CUP and the cabinet challenged the Palace’s authority. The
initial months of the revolution produced 5 changes in government. Saiid Pasha,
the first Grand Vizier after the revolution survived for only 2 weeks before
the CUP forced him out of office. In forming Saiid Pasha’s cabinet Sultan
Abdulhamid II insisted on his right to appoint the Ministers of War and of the
Navy directly instead of only approving the Grand Vizier’s choice. The CUP
disagreed. Saiid Pasha sided with the Sultan. The CUP forced Saiid Pasha’s
resignation.[25] The second
Grand Vizier, Kamel Pasha, appointed in August 1908, was in power for about 6
months when the CUP caused Parliament to vote him out of office on February 14,
1909. Finally, on April 27, 1909, in the aftermath of the counter-revolutionary
uprising of April 12, 1909, the CUP deposed Sultan Abdulhamid II on April 27,
1909 and installed in his place his brother Sultan Mehmet V.
Although,
officially Sultan Abdulhamid II signed the appointment decree to the Mecca
Emirate, it was unlikely that he had made that decision on his own. A weakened
Sultan who had little, if any, authority left during the last 6 months of his reign
could not have taken such an important decision. Indeed, when the Sultan had
the authority to appoint Sharif Hussin to the coveted post he declined to do so three times. Also, it was Sultan Abdulhamid II who exiled Sharif Hussein
from Mecca to Istanbul in the first place and kept him under his watchful eye for 15
years?
The Porte
Kamel
Pasha had a strained relationship with the CUP during his 6 months in office. A
glimpse into Kamel Pasha’s relationship with the CUP, could
be seen through a memorandum he handed to Sharif Hussein when the Grand Vizier
was bidding the new Emir of Mecca farewell at the pier before his ship was
about to sail to Jeddah. According to Abdullah bin Hussein’s memoirs the memorandum
stated: “The blessed Hijazi administration is attached to the Great Caliphate directly.
Nothing can undermine the holy relationship that connects the Emirate with the
Sultanate, including the new constitution. So, perform your duties in
accordance with the traditional old ways, may God be with you”.[26]
The British
Embassy
Britain was the
Western power with the greatest Muslim population—70 millions in India and 16
millions in the Nile Valley. As Caliph, Sultan Abdulhamid II had a huge moral and spiritual influence over Sunni Muslims; representing some 80% of world's Muslims. The Sultan used
Islam as an instrument of foreign politics. Under such circumstances, Great Britain had to manage its
Islamic affairs carefully and skillfully.
London was
keenly interested Istanbul’s internal politics. In this regards, when it was
rumored that Sayyid Fadhl of the Zaid clan was about to be named to succeed Emir
Abdulmuttalib in 1882, London immediately requested its Charge d’Affaires in
Istanbul to inform the Port that such an appointment “would be an act of
seriously unfriendly character, which Her Majesty’s Government could not view with
indifference”. The British Embassy was also instructed to use its “discretion
to get a member of the Aoun clan appointed in accordance with the promise given
to the British Ambassador by the Sultan in March 1880”.[27]
Sharif Hussein was of the Aoun clan.
Sharif Hussein had
learned that his elevation to the Grand Sharifate in 1908 had had England’s
secret backing.[28] Mary C.
Wilson quoted Sir G. Lowther’s message of November 24, 1908 to the Foreign
Office describing Sharif Hussein as “an upright man who is unlikely to connive
at or condone the extortion on pilgrims or other malpractices of his
predecessor under the old regime”.[29]
James Morris stated that the British Ambassador
is believed to have put a gracious word of approval.[30]
Sharif Hussein’s
son, Abdullah, revealed in his memoirs that old friendship had existed between
the Egyptian royal family and Sharif Hussein’s family. Abdullah referred
to five occasions between 1912 and 1914 during which he was a guest of Khedive
Abbas Hilmi (1892-1914) at Abdin Palace.[31]
It ought to be recalled that since Britain had occupied Egypt in 1882, the Khedive was under British
control. Such circumstances could explain how Abdullah bin Hussein was
able to assist the deposed Emir of Mecca, Ali bin Abdullah, to take refuge
in Cairo under British protection.
It may be concluded that British persuasion (pressure) could have made
the Grand Visier, Kamel Pasha, who had the reputation as a pro-British liberal[32]
to drive the appointment of Sharif Hussein as the Emir of Mecca through the
Imperial Palace.
The Likely Effect of Years in Exile on Sharif Hussein
Abdullah bin
Hussein described living in Istanbul as a “residency forced upon us by coercion.”
“My father”, Abdullah continued, “was taken to Istanbul to be exiled”.[33]
Exile kept Sharif Hussein under the watchful eye of the Sultan’s informers. Adjusting
to Istanbul’s urbane life compared to Mecca could have added to the strains of living in exile.
On arrival to
Jeddah in early December 1908, a delegation from the local CUP arrived to welcome
Sharif Hussein as the first Emir of the new constitutional period. They had
hoped that a new era of modernization and progress would be ushered-in to
replace the injustices and primitiveness of the previous emirs. Instead, Sharif Hussein made clear his policy to disregard CUP policies
and pursue the traditional old ways, as Kamel Pasha instructed (see above). According
to Abdullah bin Hussein’s memoirs, his father told the delegation; “This land
is the land of God and is governed by God’s law... The Sultan who rules in the
name of what you call constitution can apply it to his own country... The
constitution of God’s land is the Sharia of God and the Sunna of His Prophet”.[34]
With such a speech
Challenges to Sharif Hussein’s Ambitions
Sharif Hussein
was challenged within the Hijaz and outside it. On the one hand, he needed to
convince the tribes of the great trust and support he enjoys with the Porte. On
the other, he needed to convince the Porte of his effective control and leadership
over the tribes and the local scene.
Soon after
landing in Jeddah, he announced to tribal leaders that “he could secure with
one telegraph enough troops to turn the entire Hijaz upside down.[35]In the Hijaz, the Vilayet
administrative structure was not conducive to easy relations between the
Ottoman Vali (governor) and the Emir of Mecca. Although the Emir’s domain was
traditionally held to be over the pilgrimage and Bedouin affairs, the lines of
authority and responsibility of the two positions were blurred. Conflict
between Emir and Vali was inevitable, especially between young CUP men and an
old traditional Emir. In the five
years between December 1908 and the end of 1913 seven Valis were replaced.
Conflicts involved public issues—Preventing the extension of the Hijaz Railway
from Medina (completed in 1908) to Mecca and Jeddah, disallowing the imposition
of conscription in the Hijaz, retaining religious law in Hijazi courts, as well
as personal issues—allegations of misuse of funds, registering large tracts of
state land in Sharif Hussein’s name, taxes that went into his account, and using
the military police for his personal aggrandizement.[36]
Outside the
Hijaz, Sharif Hussein’s hope for a kingdom greater than the Hijaz, possibly
even a Caliphate encompassing all Sunni Muslims, was frustrated by the
aspirations of four independently minded rivals surrounding the Hijaz. Two were
pro-Istanbul—Ibn Rashid to the North in Hail and the Zaidi Imam in Yemen. A
third, Muhammad Idrisi to the southwest in Asir, was expressly anti-Ottoman. In
1910, he attacked the Turkish garrison in Abha, Asir. At the request of the
Porte, Sharif Hussein fought Idrisi in 1911 and again in 1913 without
conclusive result. Eventually, Idrisi signed on April 30, 1915 a treaty of friendship
and border recognition with Britain.
The most serious
regional rival to Sharif Hussein, however, was Ibn Saud to the east in Najd.
Embarking from his refuge in Kuwait in 1890, Ibn Saud had succeeded by 1908 to
consolidate his territory east of the Hijaz. A century earlier, it may be
recalled that Ibn Saud and his Wahhabi compatriots conquered the Hijaz. It was
only due to Muhammad Ali of Egypt that the Wahhabi movement was destroyed at
that time. Now, Sharif Hussein had Ibn Saud as a neighbor. If his domain was to
survive, let alone expand beyond the Hijaz, Ibn Saud’s power had to be
eliminated. Sharif Hussein warned the Porte against the danger if the Wahhabi
movement is not checked and solicited their help to attack him. In 1910, he
invaded Ibn Saud, without the support of Istanbul. The results were dubious,
although Sharif Hussein’s forces captured a brother of Ibn Saud. Ibn Saud
signed on December 26, 1915, a treaty of friendship and border recognition with
Britain similar to that of the Idrisi a few months earlier. Ibn Saud was
allowed by Britain to conquer the Hijaz in 1925, ending Sharif Hussein’s
project.
Sharif Hussein’s Dealings with British Officials
While in exile
in Istanbul (1893-1908), Sharif Hussein was anxious to cultivate good relations
with British officials. “He entered into cordial relations with the British
Embassy, so far as prudence allowed, and had encountered friendliness”, wrote
George Antonius.[37] Some months
before his appointment as Emir of Mecca, Sharif Hussein sent the British
Ambassador in Istanbul a “very friendly message expressing his feeling of
gratitude to England for her sympathy towards the Ottoman constitutional
movement”.[38]
That an anti-constitutionalist like Sharif Hussein would take such an
opportunity to gain favor with the British Ambassador is curious.
Meetings between
Abdullah bin Hussein and Lord Kitchener in 1912/1913
Sharif Hussein’s
son Abdullah, according to his Memoirs, met around mid 1913 with Lord Kitchener,
British High Commissioner in Cairo, for the first time while visiting with the
Khedive of Egypt at Abdin Palace. To Abdullah bin Hussein’s surprise, Lord
Kitchener just appeared at the palace.[39]
The date of this meeting, however, might have been a year, possibly more that a year, earlier. According to
a diplomatic report to the French Foreign Ministry, “as early as January 1912
the French Consul in Jeddah reported a trip Abdullah took to Cairo with the
purpose of seeking the Khedive’s support” and that “the first contact between
Abdullah and British authorities may have occurred on this occasion.[40]
British
Documents corroborate the French account on the date of the meeting; namely, 1912. They also reveal that: “Hints of the aspirations cherished by Hussein and his family
had been given privately to Lord Kitchener by Abdullah”.[41]
According to
Abdullah bin Hussein’s memoirs, he paid a reciprocal visit to Lord Kitchener at
the suggestion of the Khedive following the Abdin Palace meeting.
During this visit, “Lord Kitchener intimated that he had learned that Istanbul
might be contemplating major administrative changes in Arabia and that, if
there were to be a change in the position of Emir of Mecca”, Lord Kitchener inquired, “would Sharif Hussein accept the change”?[42]
Abdullah bin Hussein told Lord Kitchener that his father “would not
object, but should Sharif Hussein deem defending his position to
be in the best interest of his sacred nation”, Abdullah added, “would
Britain come to his aid?”[43]
Lord Kitchner replied: “We have with Turkey traditional friendship that precludes
us from interfering in its internal affairs”.[44]
Abdullah then retorted: “Was Kuwait not a part of the Ottoman Empire
when the British Governor of India interfered in its internal affairs at the
request of governor Mubarak Al-Sabah”?[45]
With the Anglo-Turkish
Convention of July 29, 1913 Great Britain was disinterested in new alliances in
Arabia prior to entering WWI [it already had treatise with Muscat (1891),
Bahrain (1892), and Kuwait (1899)]. This might explain why Idrisi’s advances
for a treaty with Britain had to wait till April 30, 1915, after WWI had
started, and why the treaty of Ibn Saud, also, had to wait till December 26,
1915.
It is noteworthy that Lord Kitchener, according to Abdullah bin Hussein's memoirs, made available to him the use of a British Navy ship to get him out of Istanbul should he wish.
Communications with
the British Authorities in Cairo on the eve of WWI
According to
Abdullah bin Hussein’s memoirs, Sir Ronald Storrs of the British Embassy in
Cairo sent him in August/ early September 1914 a hand delivered letter with an Egyptian
agent of Storrs named Ali Al-Bazzar. In this letter, Sir Ronald asked a
question which reveals that an earlier discussion on the subject of the revolt
and independence from Turkish rule had taken place between the British and the Sharif side: “Since the Ottoman Government disregarded its traditional
friendship with Great Britain by joining Britain’s enemy, Germany, Britain has
no longer the obligation to honor its old traditional ties with Turkey. As
such, are you and your majestic father still interested in your initial
position to work towards whatever that could lead to the full independence of
the Arabs? If yes, then Great Britain is ready to support the Arab movement
with every thing that it needs”.[46]
According to British
Documents, On September 24, 1914, five weeks before Great Britain declared war
against the Ottoman Empire, “Lord Kitchener, caused a secret messenger to be
sent to Abdullah bin Hussein inquiring how his father would stand if the
Ottoman Empire sided with Germany against Great Britain”.[47]
Abdullah replied by letter to the effect that if his Majesty’s Government would
Guarantee the rights of the Emir and the Emirate, support their rights against
foreign aggression and give assurance in writing of such support, the Sherifial
family would prefer to be on the British rather than the Ottoman side”.[48]
Lord Kitchener’s secret messenger was the same Ali Al-Bazzar who Abdullah had
met a month or so earlier.[49]
The British
authorities in Cairo agreed these terms on October 31, 1914 the day of the
British declaration of war against the Ottoman Empire. The letter to Abdullah
bin Hussein read: “If the Emir of Mecca is willing to assist Great Britain in
this conflict, Great Britain is willing, recognizing and respecting the sacred
and unique office of Emir Hussein (titles), to guarantee the independence,
rights and privileges of the Sharifate against all external foreign aggression,
in particular that of the Ottomans.”[50]
“Till now,” the letter continued, “we have defended Islam in the person of the
Turks; Henceforward, it shall be in that of the noble Arabs.”[51]
This message reached Abdullah on November 16, 1914 and “caused him the
liveliest satisfaction”.[52]
Sharif Hussein caused an answer to be sent to Cairo, in which “Abdullah
definitely committed his father to a policy of un-avowed alliance with
England.”[53]
Alliance with
Britain was Sharif Hussein’s best option. Should Britain win the war, and
despite the generality and vagueness these letters Sharif Hussein was
tantalized by the prospect of a kingdom, even a Caliphate, as well. On the
other hand, if Britain were to lose the war, Sharif Hussein’s position was not
going to be worse than the one awaiting him had he remained loyal to Istanbul.
His constant conflicts with CUP officials since he became Emir of Mecca (1908) were
going to lead to his removal from the Emirate anyway. The arrival of General
Vahib Pasha as Vali in early 1914 convinced Sharif Hussein that his days as
Emir of Mecca were numbered.
Sharif Hussein’s
motives behind the revolt became clear when he proclaimed himself in early
November 1916, five months after the revolt had started, as “King of the Arabs”.
Britain and France notified him of their displeasure with such a title. Two
months later, on January 3, 1917, the two countries recognized Sharif Hussein
as merely “King of the Hijaz”. In March 1924, immediately after the abolition
of the caliphate in Turkey, Sharif Hussein caused Muslim bodies in the Hijaz,
Palestine, Syria, and Iraq to proclaim him as Islam’s Caliph.[54]
An undertaking
by the British authorities in Cairo was made towards the end of June 1915. It
stated that the British Government would “make it an essential condition in the
terms of peace that the Arabian Peninsula and its Mohammedan Holy places should
remain in the hands of an independent Sovereign State. But it is not possible
to define at this stage exactly what territory should be included in this
State”.[55]
The substance of the undertaking was included in a proclamation distributed
in Egypt, Sudan and Arabia. Copies of the proclamation were also smuggled to
Syria and other places.
Meanwhile, Sharif
Hussein had got in touch with the Syrian Nationalist Committee in Damascus.[56]
An emissary from the Al-Fatat Secret Society met in January 1916 with Sharif
Hussein in Mecca.[57] Syria’s
support was important to Sharif Hussein. It had the potential of expanding his future
kingdom well beyond the Hijaz into the Levant and Iraq. It was also an
opportunity for him to impress Britain with his far-reaching influence in the
region.
We have seen
that the political aspirations of the majority of Syrian and Iraqi parties and
societies were for autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, not separation.
One of the reasons was their fear from European encroachment. This position was
reiterated in a resolution taken by the higher committee of the Al-Fatat Secret
Society a few months prior to the March 26, 1915 visit of Faisal bin Hussein to
Damascus. It said: “In consequence of Turkey’s entry into the war… it being
resolved that, in the event of European designs appearing to materialize, the
Society shall be bound to work on the side of Turkey in order to resist foreign
penetration of whatever kind or form”.[58]
Within two months, by the time Faisal bin Hussein returned to Damascus on May
23, 1915, Al-Fatat and Al-Ahd Societies became interested in joining Sharif
Hussein’s revolt. But, on the condition that Britain would agree to the
independence of Arab countries lying within frontiers outlined in what became
to be known as the Damascus Protocol. This document set the borders of the new
independent State. Faisal took the document to his father to determine whether
or not the British Government would accept it. Sharif Hussein included the Damascus Protocol in his first letter to Sir Henry McMahon on July 14, 1915,
only to agree four months later to a greatly modified version of the Protocol without advising
his compatriots in Damascus of the modifications (see below).
Was the
change in activists' position between March 26, 1915 and
May 23, 1915 due to Jamal Pasha’s execution of activists
in Damascus and Beirut?
The answer is that contrary to the commonly held view
in the Arab world that Jamal Pasha’s actions were responsible for the shift in activists' position from self-rule within the Ottoman Empire to separation and independence,
the chronology of events suggests that this contention is false. Jamal Pasha
arrived Damascus in early December 1914. His two acts of mass executions were
on August 21, 1915, when 11 nationalist activists were hanged in Beirut, and on
May 6, 1916, when 21 nationalist activists were hanged in Beirut (14) and
Damascus (7). Since the Societies’ change of heart occurred around the time of Faisal
bin Hussein’s visit to Damascus on May 23, 1915, three months before the first
wave of executions and one year before the second wave, it is not possible to connect
the two events. Further, until Jamal Pasha embarked upon his campaign to the
Suez Canal on February 2, 1915, which failed, it was in his best interest to
rally the support of the Syrians rather than antagonize them.
The Correspondence Between Sharif Hussein and Sir Henry McMahon
Aside from five
letters, the first of which was initiated by Sharif Hussein on July 14, 1915,
or by his son Abdullah, and five responses, the last of which was reciprocated
on March 10, 1916, by Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Cairo
(Lord Kitchener’s successor), there is no evidence of a formal agreement
between the parties, or a single face to face meeting. This, curiously,
contrasts with the two formal agreements Britain had signed during the same
period with each of Idrisi and Ibn Saud. Details of the Sharif/ McMahon
correspondence remained officially secret until February 1939 when the British
Government de-classified and published them on the occasion of the London
Round-Table Meetings on Palestine.
Four points
should be noted regarding the letters: 1) Except for the first letter from Sharif
Hussein, which was published in English, all others were published in Arabic.
2) These letters did not reflect the entire discussions between the two
parties. In his 2nd letter on October 26, 1915, Sir Henry ended by
writing that the courier of his letter would inform Sharif Hussein verbally
certain useful matters.[59]
3) The Secretary of the 1939 Conference, H. F. Downie, wrote on February 15, 1939:
“It was not certain that the revealed documents were verbatim copies of the
originals. 4) Sharif Hussein kept the contents of these contacts to himself. On
February 15, 1920, in an interview granted by Faisal bin Hussein to Al-Mufid
Newspaper he complained that he never saw any correspondence between his father
and the British and that his repeated requests for the correspondence to use as
a weapon in his negotiations went unanswered.[60]
In his first
letter to Sir Henry McMahon on July 14, 1915, Sharif Hussein included the terms
of the Damascus Protocol in their entirety; namely, that “England to
acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries, bounded on the North by
Mersina and Adana up to 37 degree latitude, on which degree fall Birjik, Urfa,
Mardin, Amadia Island (Jazirah), up to the border of Persia; on the East by the
borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the South, by the Indian Ocean,
with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the West, by
the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina”.[61]
This map came as a surprise to British officials. It complicated matters for
them. Aside from her own interests, Britain was in partnership with France,
which wanted after winning the war to have Syria and Cilicia and with Russia,
which wanted Constantinople and the Straits.
The response letter
from Sir Henry to Sharif Hussein was on October 24, 1915. It provided Sharif
Hussein with a good idea about the price, which Britain was prepared to pay him
in return for the revolt. Sir Henry wrote: “The districts of Mersina and
Alexandretta and the portion of Syria lying to the West of the districts of Damascus,
Homs, Hama and Aleppo can not said to be purely Arab and should be excluded
from the proposed limits and boundaries. With the above modifications and
without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab Chiefs we accept these
limits and boundaries, and in regard to these portions of the territories
therein in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the
interests of her ally, France, subject to the above modification Great Britain
is prepared to recognize... the boundaries proposed by the Sharif of Mecca.[62]
In his third
letter to Sir Henry on November 5, 1915, Sharif Hussein accepted the exclusion
of the Vilayet of Adana, including the Port of Mersina from his proposed State.
Also, He consented to British occupation of those parts of Iraq, which were in
British hands in November 1915 for a period of time in return for a suitable pecuniary
assistance from Britain.
In his fourth
letter to Sir Henry dated January 1, 1916, Sharif Hussein left the amount of
pecuniary compensation for those parts of Iraq in British hands to the “wisdom
and the sense of justice of Great Britain". He also declared his desire to
“avoid what may possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France in the
war” and decided to "postpone" discussing the inclusion of those portions of Beirut
and its coasts until “the first opportunity after the war is finished.”[63]
Pleased with
Sharif Hussein constructive attitude, Sir Henry replied in his fifth letter on
January 25, 1916: “As regards the Northern parts, we note with satisfaction
your desire not to do anything which might possibly injure the alliance of
Great Britain and France”.[64]
As the war
ended, Sharif Hussein’s role ended too and with it the “postponed” discussion on
the Damascus Protocol.
Observation
The story of
Sharif Hussein’s revolt is a story of betrayal, not only of his Ottoman
co-religionists and rulers in the middle of the war but also of his own Arab compatriots in Syria and
Iraq. Sharif Hussein used
the Damascus Protocol in the negotiations with Britain to obtain for himself and his family the biggest possible kingdom. Six months later, he accepted a much smaller kingdom without
even advising his compatriots in Syria and Iraq.
In
declaring his desire to “avoid what may possibly injure the alliance of Great
Britain and France in the war,” Sharif Hussein compromised himself. The
Bolsheviks revealed on November 23, 1917 the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement, which divided
the Levant and Iraq after the war had ended between Great Britain and France.
On the other
hand, the Sykes-Picot Agreement reflects British and French duplicity in
dealing with Sharif Hussein. The Balfour Declaration on November 2, 1917 compromised Sharif Hussein credibility among Arabs further. As
compensation, Britain made Sharif Hussein’s son Faisal king over Iraq and created
for his other son, Abdullah, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
Sharif Hussein abdicated
in 1924 to his eldest son Ali and took refuge in the Red Sea Port of Aqaba
until June 1925 when British officials ordered him to leave. He elected to go
to Cyprus. At the end of 1930, a stroke afflicted him and he was allowed to go
to Amman to spend his last days near his son, now King Abdullah.[65]
Sharif Hussein died on June 4, 1931, aged seventy-six. Ali bin Hussein lost the
Hijaz in 1925 when Britain allowed Ibn Saud to take-over of the Hijaz.
[1] “Manshour Al Thawrra” (Declaration of the Revolution), cited in
Amin Saiid, Al Thawra Al Arabia Al Kubra
(The Great Arab Revolution), Vol.1 (Madbouli Publications, Cairo, 1934),
PP. 150-157.
2 Abdullah bin Hussein, Muthakkirati (My Memoirs), 2nd. Edition (Al-Ahlia Publications,
Beirut, 1998), P. 111.
[3] Z. N. Zeine, The Emergence of
Arab Nationalism, (Caravan Books, N.Y. 1976), P. 83.
[6] George Antonius, The Arab
Awakening. The Story of the Arab National Movement, (Hamish Hamilton,
London, 1938), P. 110.
[7] Nouri As-Saiid, Muthakkarat
Nouri As-Saiid Aan Alharakaat Alaskariyya Liljaish Alarabi Fi Al Hijaz Wa
Souriyya 1916-1918 (Memoirs of Nouri
As-Saiid Regarding the Military Movements of the Arab Army in the Hijaz and
Syria 1916-1918), 2nd. Edition (Beirut, 1987), P. 20.
[13] Great Britain, Foreign Office, 78/575,
Turkey (Diplomatic), Dispatch No.10, September 19, 1844, cited in Z. N. Zeine, Emergence, P. 41.
[14] H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islamic
Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Muslim
Culture (Oxford University Press, 1950-1957), Vol. 1, Pt. 1, P. 160.
[27] S. T. Buzpinar, Abdulhamid
II, Islam and the Arabs, Ph.D. Dissertation (Manchester, 1991), P. 279.
[28] George Aintonius, The Arab
Awakening, P. 175.
[29] Mary C. Wilson, “The Hashemites, the Arab Revolt, and Arab
Nationalism”, in The Origins of Arab
Nationalism, editors; Rashid Khalidi et al. (Columbia University Press, New
York, 1991), P. 207.
[30] James Morris, The Hashemite
Kings (Faber & Faber, London, 1959), P. 25.
[31] Abdullah bin Hussein, Memoires,
PP. 51, 57, 75, 83, &101.
[32]The Encyclopaedia of Islam,
New Edition, (Leiden and London, 1971), “Hussein”, P. 605 and
[41]British Documents on Foreign
Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print.
General Editors: Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt, Section Five, P. 391.
[59] Z. N. Zeine, Alsiraa Aldawli
Fi Alsharq Alawsat Wa Wiladat Dawlatai Souriya Wa Lubnan (The International
Struggle in the Middle East and the Birth of Syria and Lebanon)(Beirut, 1971), P. 281 & 282.
[60] Anis Sayegh, Alhashimiyyoun
Wa Qadiyyat Philastin (The Hashimites and the Problem of Palestine)
(Beirut, 1966), P. 55.
